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I. INTRODUCTION

An increasingly litigious U.S. social environment has contributed to an
increased occurrence of U.S. citizens sheltering significant portions of their
wealth in offshore asset protection trusts. Simply stated, an offshore asset
protection trust ("OAPT" or "offshore APT") is a trust which is established
under foreign trust laws by a U.S. citizen, typically managed by a foreign
trustee, and "designed to lawfully remove assets from the settlor's balance
sheet without creating any adverse federal tax consequences or requiring
the settlor to lose all control over [such] assets."' More generally, the term
"asset protection trust" (or "APT") can be viewed as a trust, the assets of
which are, as to a particular beneficiary, immune from the claims of that
beneficiary's creditors.
The increasingly common utilization of such OAPTs by wealthy U.S.
citizens has led to more widespread recognition of such entities by the U.S.
financial, legal, and government communities. Indeed, with a
conservatively estimated $2,000,000,000,000 (that's TRILLION) in assets
held in offshore trusts,2 there can be little doubt that inroads into this
1. Michael H. Azad, Asset Protection Planning with Offshore Trusts and Offshore
Corporations,12 TAX NOTES INT'L500 (1996).
2. WALTER H. DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND

ANALYSIS at FRW-1 (1999). Other estimates place the figure as high as six-trillion dollars. See Eric
Henzy, Offshoreand "Other" Shore Asset ProtectionTrusts, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 739,740

n.3 (1999) (citing estimate by Britain's Home Secretary as reported in pound currency at David
Leigh, BillionsHidden Offshore; Jersey Faces Tax Clampdown, GuARDIAN (LONDON), Sept. 26,

1998, at 1); see also Debra Baker, Island Castaway, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1998, at 54 (placing estimate
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lucrative market will be pursued with increasing aggressiveness by
domestic enterprises. Somewhat surprising, however, is the directness with
which the states of Alaska and Delaware are openly vying to share in the
spoils inherent in the movement and management of such wealth. Those
two domestic jurisdictions have, over the last few years, enacted trust
legislation with the expressly stated objective of attracting to their
respective states the wealth management business that has in recent years
begun moving offshore at an alarming pace.3 In order to counter the
success offshore jurisdictions have enjoyed in attracting clients seeking
asset protection coupled with wealth management, Alaska and Delaware
by competitive necessity have included in their respective statutes
provisions granting to trust settlors a degree of explicit asset protection
benefits previously unavailable in any United States jurisdiction.
Dispelling any notions that the Alaska and Delaware legislation can be
ignored as an isolated and passing trend, legislation similar to that of
Alaska and Delaware became effective in Nevada on October 1, 1999, and
a mirror image of the Alaska legislation was proposed but not acted upon
in the 1999 session of the Texas House.4
The primary focus of this article is upon the extent to which a trust
settlor's retention of an interest in a domestic asset protection trust

as high as five-trillion dollars).
3. As to the pace at which funds have been moving from the United States to offshore
jurisdictions, see Part IV, infra. Demonstrative of the objectives underlying the new domestic
legislation, the legislative history behind the recent changes to Delaware's trust legislation is
explicit in noting that "[t]hese new [statutory] features should make Delaware a more attractive
jurisdiction for establishing trusts that are protected, under certain defined conditions, from claims
of a settlor's creditors" and that certain of those statutory features were. specifically "intended to
facilitate the repatriation of existing offshore trusts to Delaware." H.B. No. 747, 139th Sess. (Del.
1988) printed in 71 DEL LAWS 343 (1998). The history of the Alaska statutory changes reveals
similar motivations. See H.B. 101 (Alaska 1997) (statement of Rep. Al Veezy, R-North Pole)
("Alaska has the opportunity to establish itself as a major financial market for the U.S. and even the
world.").
4. 1999 NEv. STAT. §§ 166.040-.060 (Assembly Bill No. 469); H.B. 1553 (Tex. 1999)
(introduced Feb. 17, 1999). Because the Nevada legislation appears to be an adaption of the more
detailed Alaska and Delaware statutes, and given that the Texas legislation has not yet become law,
the analytical focus of this article will be upon the provisions of the Alaska and Delaware
legislation. Occasional reference will, however, be made to certain variations in the Nevada
legislation. It should also be noted that pertinent legislation in Missouri and Colorado should be
examined for its self-settled asset protective features, although such legislation is of debatable
impact and in any event predates the domestic asset protection trust movement initiated by Alaska's
1997 adoption of comprehensive asset protection trust legislation. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.080
(1992) (providing limited creditor protection forself-settled spendthrift trusts, datingbackto 1983);
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38.10-.111 (1997) (providing protection for self-settled spendthrift trusts as
against future creditors). The Colorado statute, which apparently dates back to 1861, is discussed
in Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few BadApples Spoil the
Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 763,774 (1999).
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("DAPT" or "domestic APT") created by that settlor affects traditional
transfer tax planning dynamics. Specifically, it has long been held to be
against public policy for a trust settlor to place property in trust while
naming himself or herself as a beneficiary thereof, such that the
settlor/beneficiary can still enjoy the trust property while preventing the
settlor/beneficiary' s creditors from reaching such property. Likewise, it has
long been a tenant of the federal transfer tax regime that property given
away will nevertheless be subject to inclusion in the transferor's gross
estate at death if the transferor retains enjoyment of such property until
death. Any other transfer tax result has been described as an impermissible
"have your cake and eat it too" scheme.' By virtue of the recent domestic
trust legislation, however, these long-standing United States principles
have been challenged in a manner more direct and definite than that
implicated solely by trends in offshore jurisdictions. The resulting
concept--that a transferor's retention of a beneficial domestic trust interest
might not result in the inclusion of such trust property in the transferor's
gross estate at death-has a profound impact upon the traditional approach
to estate and gift tax planning.
Presented first is a general examination of the recent movement towards
using the trust entity as an asset protection vehicle for the benefit and
protection of the individual establishing and funding the trust. This
movement raises both tax policy and social policy questions which, while
not resolved herein, are presented as background to understanding the nontraditional estate and gift tax planning analysis which these new domestic
statutes implicate. The specific Alaska and Delaware trust legislation is
explained, as are questions concerning the effectiveness of that legislation
in delivering its purported asset protection benefits. Although such

5. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value

Lines, 43 TAXL. REV. 241, 271 (1988) (noting in context of distributions from a trust not included
in the settlor's gross estate at death: "It might be supposed that the settlor in such a case has the
cake while her estate eats it too.. . ."); Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection
Trusts: Icing on the Cake?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 399,400 n.1 (1996) (noting prior articles titled by
reference to this analogy, and expressing desire to "abstain from all mention of cakes and
confections in future articles"). See also RICHARD 3. STEPHENS ETAL., FEDERALESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION § 4.08 (7th ed. 1997), wherein the interrelationship of Internal Revenue Code §§ 2033
and 2036(a)(1) is described as follows:
[A]s far as ... section [2033] is concerned, an individual could gratuitously
transfer property in trust, ridding himself of legal title, and yet retain the right to
income from the property for life without having his estate suffer an estate tax
liability with respect to the property upon his death. This, of course, would be a
real cake-and-eat-it scheme; but it is frustrated by Section 2036(a)(1).

For an explanation of how this "having your cake and eating it too" scenario might arise today, see
infra note 135, and accompanying text.
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questions cannot at this point be definitively answered since the asset
protection provisions of the domestic legislation remain untested in any
reported decision, such questions are nevertheless considered as a
necessary adjunct to the primary focus of this article-specifically, the
extent to which a DAPT created under and (at least purportedly) governed
by Delaware, Alaska, or Nevada law should be considered as an
enhancement to a traditional estate and gift tax-planning strategy.
I. THE (PERCEIVED) NEED FOR ASSET PROTECTION
It is easy to perceive the basis for the liability concerns which have led
many wealthy individuals to seek to remove at least a portion of their
assets from the reach of potential claimants. A cursory review of any
national newspaper or news magazine is likely to reveal, on a frequently
recurring basis, a story (or two, or several) about:
" someone being sued in an action where the potential
liability stakes are high, not to mention the very real cost
of litigation that will be endured even if no judgment
against the alleged wrongdoer is entered;
° someone recovering a substantial judgment under what
most people would have, at least ten or fifteen years ago,
deemed a ridiculous cause of action;6
* someone experiencing a drastic downturn in their fortunes,
both circumstantial and monetary, leaving them much less
financially prepared for the future than anticipated; or
" someone, in anticipation of one of the foregoing events,
taking steps to lessen their potential exposure to financial
devastation which could result from such events.7

6. Although potential judgments might not ultimately qualify as substantial (only time will
tell), heretofore unimaginable lawsuits are proliferating. As one such example, National Public

Radio reported recently that a school teacher has filed suit against a student whom the teacher
caught smoking in the bathroom, for alleged physical injuries suffered by the teacher as a direct
result of the student's smoking (this was not, apparently, a case of student-against-teacher violence
in the schools). See NPR MorningEdition(NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 15, 1999). The suit included
a claim for "unspecified punitive damages." Id.

7. As to the latter point, asset protection in its most rudimentary form was a surprising
footnote to the recent $107 million judgment entered against the proprietors of the notorious
"abortion hit-list" Web site. In the reports of the judgment, the liable proprietors were noted as
stating that they had already undertaken asset transfers so as to render themselves "judgmentproof." Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators of Anti-Abortion Web Site Told to Pay Millions, N.Y.
TMES, Feb. 3, 1999 at A9.
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Indeed, some of the popular literature posits the case for asset
protection by focusing on the litigation boom in the United States,
generating enthusiasm in introductory pages by reciting the range of people
subject to unexpected litigation, and the large verdicts juries have become
prone to award.' One practitioner's more professional recitation of some
of the domestic threats to wealth which are driving the growth of asset
protection as a legal practice area includes:
" Risks associated with contractual guarantees (or other
potential failings), or liability attributable to a business
venture or associate therein;
" The escalating cost of liability insurance premiums,
coupled with the narrowing scope of coverage and
ongoing questions about stability within the insurance
industry;
" Growing regulatory liability, such as in the field of land
ownership and environmental concerns;
* Divorce claims and concerns arising incident to divorce,
which cannot always be addressed adequately through
premarital agreements (e.g., "the evolution of interspousal tort liability claims");
* A desire to ensure that intended beneficiaries receive
wealth at death, notwithstanding forced heirship, former
spouses or other claimants; and
* New theories of liability attributable to a particularly
creative plaintiffs' bar, as well as the growing measure of
damages for injuries that are often purely subjective in
nature. 9
It is difficult to refute the validity of the foregoing concerns, and it has
always been the province of wise counsel to be proactive in limiting the
liability exposure of clients. Today that concept, for good or ill, is evolving

8. See, e.g., ROBERTF.KLUEGER, AGUIDETOASSETPROTEcTION-HOwTOKEEPWHAT'S
LEGALLY YOURS 12-13 (1997) (reciting stories of a priest sued for "negligent care" by a suicidal
parishioner, among others); MARK WARDA, SIMPLE WAYS To PROTEcr YOURSELFFROM LAwsuITs
8-9 (1997) (noting jury awards of up to $569 million, including a $986,000 jury award to a lady
"who 'lost her psychic powers' after a CAT scan").
9. See Leslie C. Giordani, Asset Protection:Domestic andForeignPlanningAlternatives,
33 S. FED. TAX. INST., Oct. 1998, at WI-2.
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to include advice not only as to the client's activities and business
structures, but also advice as to the manner in which the client holds (or
more sheepishly, enjoys) his or her assets. On the other hand, it is merely
the legal and financial environment and the degree of asset protection
planning which has changed-asset protection has always been a central
element of estate planning.' Itis products of this changed environment,
however, which have given rise to new opportunities for the estate planner
and clients.
III. SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS

Before going into further detail, it is first prudent to examine generally
the basic legal doctrines under which a trust might purportedly provide
some degree of assetprotection to its beneficiaries. Most commonly, a trust
settlor may attempt to shield a beneficiary's interests from the claims of the
beneficiary's creditors by:
Creating a "discretionary trust" which provides that
distributions to the beneficiary are subject to the
unrestricted discretion of the trustee, as to which
discretion the trustee cannot be compelled to exercise in
favor of the beneficiary, the beneficiary's creditors, or
anyone else; or
" Creating a "spendthrift trust," the terms of which
incorporate specific "spendthrift" language expressly
prohibiting the voluntary and involuntary alienation (by
creditor attachment or otherwise) of the beneficiary's trust
interest."

10. See, e.g., Jonathan Blattmachr et al., Trusts and Estates: Alaska'sRevision of Its Trust
Act, Which Sets Out to PermitTrusts to PreserveAssets andReduce Taxes, May Have Implications
for Trust PlanningNationwide,NAT'LL.J., June 6, 1997, at B5 ('Two common goals in estate
planning are estate tax reduction and protection of assets from claims of creditors."); Joseph A.
Field, Asset Protection Planning-A Look at Some of the Drawbacks-The Case Against, in
DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 2, 2001, at INT 201-07 (1999) ("Mhis type of [asset
protection] planning is really nothing more or less than fine tuning of 'plain vanilla' trust
structuring, which practitioners have undertaken for centuries in one form or another."); Giordani,
supra note 9, at W4 ("[E]state planning by its very nature has always implicitly embodied asset
protection.").
I1.A"discretionary trust"is a trust under the terms of which "it is provided that the trustees
shall pay to or apply for a beneficiary only so much of the income and principal or either as the
trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see fit... ." Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
785, 804 n.12 (1986) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959)). "A
spendthrift provision provides that the interest of the beneficiary is inalienable and that creditors
cannot reach the interest in satisfaction of their claims." Id. at817 n.31. See, e.g., DEL CODEANN.
tit. 12, § 3570(9)(c) (Supp. 1998) (qualified disposition is to be made under trust instrument which
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Of course, it is possible for a settlor to create a trust which contains
multiple "protective" features, such as a discretionary trust which includes
spendthrift language. With respect to both discretionary trusts and
spendthrift trusts, however, it has been the rule since Elizabethan times that
such a trust will not be recognized to prevent the settlor'screditors from
reaching any interest in trust property to the extent such interest has been
retained by the settlor 12 Two of the more straightforward and often cited
statements of this "widely accepted legal principle" as adopted in the
United States were quoted by the Tax Court in Estate of Paxton v.
Commissioner,13 as follows:

Where a person creates for his own benefit a... discretionary
trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum
amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could
pay to him or apply for his benefit.14
If a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and inserts a
spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing or future
creditors are concerned, and they can reach his interest under
the trust.15
The rationale for this principle is grounded in public policy concerns. "It
is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his own property in such
a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching

"[p]rovides that the interest of the transferor or other beneficiary.. . may not be transferred,
assigned, pledged or mortgaged, whether voluntarily or involuntarily .... ).
A "self-settled" trust is a trust created and (at least in part) funded by someone who is included
as a beneficiary of the trust. See Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1998). The court in Brooks adopts this simple definition by reference to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Section 156(2). See id.; 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 156(2)
(1959). Both types of trust-the discretionary and the expressly spendthrift trust-when including
the settlor as a beneficiary are referred to herein as a "self-settled spendthrift trust" for ease of
reference. For a further exposition on the mechanisms and terminology with respect to creditorprotected trusts interests, see Elena Marty-Nelson, OffshoreAsset ProtectionTrusts: Having Your
Cake and EatingIt Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 11, 16-28 (1994).
12. See ]IAAUSTINWAKEMANSCOTr&W.iiAFRANKLINFATCHER,THELAWoFTRuSTS
§ 156 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter HA SCOTT & FRATCHER] (tracing origin of this rule to Statute of
King Henry VII passed in 1487, which voided conveyances in trust for the use of the transferor).
Also relevant in this regard is the English Statute of Elizabeth, which voids a transfer lacking
consideration and intended to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1571). See A.
JAMES CASNER & JEFFREY N. PENNELL, 1 ESTATE PLANNING 14.1.4 nn. 31-32. (6th ed. 1998).
13. 86 T.C. 785 (1986).
14. Id. at 814 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTRUSTS § 156(2) (1959)).
15. Id. at 815 n.26 (quoting GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE

LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 223 (rev. 2d ed. 1992)).
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Likewise, it has long been a tenant of the federal transfer tax regime
that retained enjoyment of transferred property carries with it taxability of
that property in the transferor's estate at death.1 7 In the trust context, a
settlor' s retention of even a discretionary interest in property transferred by
such settlor to a trust results in inclusion of the trust property in the
settlor's taxable estate at death, to the extent that under applicable state law
the settlor's creditors can reach such trust property by virtue of the
doctrines discussed above which invalidate self-settled spendthrift trusts.18
Traditionally, creditors had the right in virtually all states to access trust
property in satisfaction of a claim against a settlor/beneficiary,"9 such that
the resulting estate tax consequences were both obvious and negative. In
light of the new Delaware, Alaska, and Nevada statutes, however, it is now
time to reconsider the validity of these long-standing United States
principles. Before examining how the new domestic statutes purport to
change the general rule invalidating self-settled spendthrift trusts-thereby
correspondingly impacting the federal estate and gift tax consequences
attendant such trusts-it is relevant to consider further the background
against which such domestic legislation has been enacted.
IV. THE MOVEMENT OF WEALTH OFFSHORE
Among the more significant changes to the asset protection and estate
planning environments over the last decade or so has been the growth in
the movement of funds into trusts created under the laws of non-U.S.
jurisdictions.20 Many such offshore jurisdictions allow settlors to retain
significant enjoyment of funds which, by virtue of being held in a trust
created under the offshore jurisdiction's trust laws, are purportedly subject

16. IIA SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 167.
17. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038 (CCH 1998). The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
and set forth in Title 26 of the United States Code, is herein cited as "I.R.C.," with reference to the
relevant Code section.
18. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038 (providing generally that property over which decedent retained
an interest, reversion or power will be includable in decedent's gross estate at death). IRS Revenue
Ruling 76-103 discusses the doctrine that creditors' rights in trust property may be deemed an
interest retained by the trust settlor. See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293 (stating that creditors'
rights are akin to settlors' powers to terminate a trust); Paxton, 86 T.C. at 814 ("Retention of the
right to use the trust as a form of security for his indebtedness [by virtue of creditors' rights to trust
property] left [the settlor] with a significant interest in the property... that is sufficient to require
[the settlor's] transfers to the trusts to be included in his gross estate under section 2036(a)(1).").
19. See, e.g., Marty-Nelson, supranote 11, at 29,38 n. 113 (noting this "universally-accepted
exception" to spendthrift trust protection, and listing 18 states which have codified the rule).
20. The terms "offshore" or "foreign" are variously used in this article to refer to non-U.S.
jurisdictions, and references to the movement of funds offshore refer generally to funds moving out
of the U.S. financial system, at least directly, and into the financial system of a foreign jurisdiction.
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to that jurisdiction's debtor-friendly laws. 21 The most glaring contrast
between the laws of such offshore jurisdictions and the traditional trust
laws of the several United States is grounded in the provisions of foreign
trust law which expressly permit the settlor of the trust to also be a
"creditor-protected" beneficiary of such trust, meaning that under the
foreign jurisdiction's laws the settlor's creditors may neither compel a trust
distribution nor attach the settlor's trust interest in satisfaction of the
settlor's debts.22
In addition and relative to the utilization of more traditional domestic
asset protection structures, proponents of OAPTs tout the benefits of
"going offshore" as including legal hurdles imposed by the foreign trust
jurisdiction which render it more difficult for a creditor to set aside a
transfer of property to a trust created under that jurisdiction's laws. 23 For
example, practical and legal hurdles that a potential claimant may face in
collecting on a U.S. judgment where the debtor's "former" assets are held
via an OAPT of which the debtor is the settlor-beneficiary include:
* Shorter limitations periods for challenging the original
transfer to the trust as fraudulent;
* A more limited class of creditors entitled to assert the
fraudulent conveyance issue at all, such as limiting such
class to only those creditors having a bona fide claim
against the debtor-settlor at the time the transfer to the
trust was made;
* Requirements that the entire matter be retried de novo in
the foreign jurisdiction's courts, sometimes with creditor
representation only via a local attorney; and
* Requirements that the plaintiff make a significant deposit

21.

See generallyPETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING AND STRATEGIES I

6 (1994) (discussing self-settled trusts); Giordani, supra note 9, at W13-18 (discussing offshore

trusts).
22. See SPERO, supra note 21, 6.08(4).
23. See Barry S. Engel, Asset Protection Planning Through the Foreign Situs Asset
ProtectionTrust-The Case For,in DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 2,1 1004, at INT 102-03
[hereinafter Engel, in DIAMOND]; Azad, supra note 1, at 502; see also Douglas J. Blattmachr &
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Directionin EstatePlanning:North To Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept.
1997, at 48, 53-54 (contrasting foreign and domestic trusts). More traditional domestic asset
protection strategies might include, for example, titling property in the name of a spouse who is not
engaged in a risky business or profession, holding property via a limited partnership or other entity
as to which a creditor may attach only the debtor's interest in the entity without the ability to
compel any distribution from the entity, or establishing a spendthrift trust for third parties. See
Giordani, supra note 9, at W4-W6.
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before proceeding with the lawsuit.' 4
Significant also are U.S. creditors' psychological disincentives to pursuing
a claim against a settlor-debtor, such as physical distance from the assets
sought and the burden of collecting through a foreign legal system against
a foreign trustee.25
Thus, with no remotely comparable asset protection vehicle available
in any domestic jurisdiction prior to the adoption in 1997 of the Alaska
spendthrift trust legislation, the movement of funds offshore is not
surprising. This movement of funds "offshore"--used here to mean out of
the U.S. financial system, at least directly, and into the financial system of
as a mere
a foreign jurisdiction-should not be dismissed without scrutiny
26
unavoidable consequence of the modem global economy.

Indeed, concern over this movement of funds offshore (and more
specifically into offshore trusts) sparked significant new foreign trust
legislation in 1996 and 1997.27 This new legislation was aimed at settlors,
beneficiaries and trustees of offshore trusts, and increased substantially the
reporting requirements to be observed when funds are transferred to
offshore trusts, imposing "harsh penalties" for compliance failure. 8
Reports on the impetus behind this legislation clearly reflect the growth of
this type of offshore planning, as well as some of the tax policy issues
thereby raised:
The foreign trust proposal is an attempt by the [Clinton]
administration to tax the income from hundreds of billions of
dollars of U.S.-source capital being stashed by U.S. taxpayers
in foreign trusts in tax havens around the world. In releasing

24. See Azad, supra note 1, at 502; Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 23, at 48, 53-54
(contrasting foreign and domestic trusts); Engel, in DIAMOND, supra note 23, at INT 102-03;
Giordani, supra note 9, at W14; Richard W. Hompesch, II et al., Does the New Alaska Trust Act
Provide an Alternative to the Foreign Trust?, J. OF ASSET PROTECTION, July-Aug. 1997, at 9.
25. See Engel in DIAMOND, supranote 23,11004.
26. Outside the more limited context of OAPT fund transfers, no less than three
Congressional Committees, the Federal Reserve, the GAO, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Treasury Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office are investigating more general issues relating
to currency movement, money laundering and the "regulatory nightmare" that has become private
banking on a global scale. S.C. Gwynne, JustHide Me the Money, TIME, Dec. 14, 1998 at 46.
27. See generally GeneralExplanation of Tax LegislationEnacted in the 104th Congress
Before the Joint Committee on Taxation, 104th Cong. (Comm. Print 1996); Robert F. Hudson, Jr.,
Loch Ness Monster or Komodo Dragons-Actualand Unexpected Results of the ForeignTrust
Legislation of 1996/1997,32 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHIIP E. HECKERLNG INST. ON EST. PLAN. 9[

1900 (Tina HestromPortundo ed., 1998); Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Fencingin Tax-Travelers-theNew
Foreign Trust Rules, 31 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHIiP E. HECKERUNG INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1700
(Tina Hestrom Portundo ed., 1997).
28. McCaffrey, supra note 27,1 1700.
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the proposal, Treasury cited press reports that nearly $650
billion has been transferred from the United States to just
three jurisdictions: the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and
Luxembourg.
According to the administration, the U.S. market for asset
protection trusts is "exploding," but is believed to be fueled
less by a desire to evade taxes than to protect assets from
creditors. Once the assets are overseas, however, taxpayers
soon realize that income generated in the overseas
accounts-and protected by strict bank secrecy laws-can
accumulate without the IRS's knowledge and, therefore, is not
reported.29
Notwithstanding the recent imposition of increased reporting
requirements and noncompliance penalties, this offshore trust area remains
of significant concern to the federal government. For example, the Tax
Division of the Attorney General's Office recently announced its plans to
"direct increased resources" towards fighting areas of international tax
fraud, including specifically offshore trust arrangements.3 The Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") is also concerned that funds, once moved
offshore, simply disappear from the U.S. tax system. Informal
conversations with IRS attorney-personnel having responsibility in this
field indicate that the IRS views offshore trust arrangements as "the tax
haven of the next millennium."31 Indeed, press reports indicate that the IRS
29. Administration ProposesAnti Abuse Rules for Foreign Trusts, Expatriation,66 TAX
NOTEs 915 (1995). Noted in the article is that in 1990, the last year for which figures were available
at the time of the Clinton proposals, U.S. persons (who were subject to information reporting
requirements that were rarely complied with) "reported the creation of 133 foreign trusts with total
assets of about $273 million... [but] reported annual income of only $3 million." Id. This would
seem to support at least one of the following arguments: that such offshore trusts are merely
avenues to committing tax fraud; that one would have to be a fool to invest $273 million with a
foreign trustee who can earn a meager $3 million on the assets; or that tax exempt investments are
even more en vogue than offshore trust arrangements.
30. Tom Herman, The JusticeDepartmentTargets Global Tax Fraudand Cybercrime,WALL
ST. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at Al.
31. Although specific and very informative conversations were had with IRS personnel
significantly connected with the crafting and enforcement of IRS policy in this area, the most wellplaced of such personnel specifically requested that no direct reference be made to his identity.
Interestingly, inquiries concerning past successes and future plans with respect to perceived abuses
in this area were met with "no comment." However, it does appear that the IRS's primary concern
is to impress upon U.S. persons that offshore trusts should be viewed as "tax neutral," in
recognition of the fact that U.S. citizens and residents are subject to U.S. taxation on their
worldwide income, not just income from U.S. sources or locations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61 (a) (1998)
("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived .. ");
Treas. Reg. § 20.20331(a) (as amended in 1963) ("The gross estate of a decedent who was a citizen or resident of the
United States at the time of his death includes.., the value of all property... wherever situated,
beneficially owned by the decedent at the time of his death."). Thus, it would appear that the IRS
efforts in this area are, in the nearterm, aimed not so much at U.S. settlors of such trusts, but rather,
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has substantially strengthened its audit presence in this area.32
The foregoing policy issues underlying the federal government's
attention to this offshore trust area reveal an obvious question; specifically:
if U.S. persons can easily enjoy (or at least pursue) asset protection benefits
by moving in the aggregate substantial sums of money offshore, and if that
movement of funds is of such concern and interest to the federal
government, should the same assetprotectionlure be denieddomestically,
where opportunities for abuse would appear to be significantly reduced if
for no other reason than the retention of those assets within the U.S.
judicial and tax reporting systems?33 Of course, "if you can't beat 'em, join
'em' is less than persuasive as a rationale for abandoning long held legal
principles embedded in current U.S. trust law, such as the prohibition
against self-settled spendthrift trusts. Nevertheless, several United States
jurisdictions have called into question the continuing validity of centuries
old notions of trust law,34 and the conflicting policy issues thereby raised
are not easily resolved. Significant among those policy issues are the
questions of what, if anything, should non-APT states and the federal
government do in response to this recent movement away from traditional
principles of state trust law.35
V. THE DoMEsTIc RESPONSE-ALASKA
AND DELAWARE TRUST LAWS
Alaska and Delaware have not been shy in expressing their respective
desire to become the leading trust jurisdiction-not only domestically but
also as an alternative to the offshore jurisdictions which have garnered so
much world-wide business in the last several years.36 In fact, one Alaska

at the unscrupulous promoters of offshore arrangements promising to assist U.S. persons in
avoiding U.S. taxes by moving funds offshore.
32. See Tax Report: The IRS IntensifiesIts Scrutiny ofAbusive Trusts, WALLST. J., Oct. 13,
1999, at Al. The IRS is committing "about 150 additional revenue agents" to this "very... fastgrowing area of noncompliance." The focus ofthe IRS's intensified scrutiny currently centers upon
promoters of these offshore trust arrangements, rather than upon the settlors of such trusts.
33. This policy argument also was recently recognized by an attorney actively engaged in the
asset protection practice. See Roundtable Discussion,32 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'LL. 779,782 (1999)
(comments of Gideon Rothschild, chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on Asset
Protection); see also Marty-Nelson, supra note 5, at 440-41 ("[S]hould two otherwise identical
taxpayers face different tax options and consequences stemming wholly from the fortuity of a trust
instrument's 'location?"').
34. See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millennium, or,We Don'tHave to Think of EnglandAnymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543,560-63 & 57274 (1998). See supra Parts III and VH.B (discussing some of the state law policy issues raised by

the Alaska and Delaware trust legislation).
35. See discussion at Part VIII, infra.
36. See supranote 3 and accompanying text. The legislative histories of both state's statutes
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legislator noted the Alaskan legislators "had research that showed large
sums of money going over to the Cayman Islands, and asked, 'Why
couldn't we do that?' ... The answer came back: 'We could."' 37 Both
Alaska and Delaware have thus enacted legislation which (1) effectively
repeals the rule against perpetuities with respect to most property held in
trust;3" (2) permits self-settled trusts to enjoy protection from the claims of
the settlor-beneficiary's creditors, subject to certain conditions; 39 and (3)
restricts the time periods for challenging transfers to trusts.40 As Nevada
and Texas have already demonstrated, the Alaska and Delaware legislation
will likely serve as the domestic model should other states choose to follow
this movement away
from the longstanding prohibition against self-settled
41
spendthrift trusts.
A. CreditorProtectionfor Settlor-Beneficiary
The domestic statutes purport to permit the shielding of trust assets
from the claims of the settlor-beneficiary's creditors, in direct opposition
to the otherwise widely accepted U.S. rule that self-settled spendthrift
trusts are not valid against such creditors. 42 In Alaska, this is accomplished
through statutory language which expressly permits a person to transfer
property in trust and to provide in the trust agreement that the
beneficiaries' interests (including the interest of the settlor as beneficiary)
may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated, except to the extent funds
have actually been paid by the trustee to the beneficiary-i.e., trust
property is subject to the claims of the beneficiary's creditors only if

recite this purpose as a key motivation behind the changes. See id; see also OpposingPartiesJoin
Forces to Attract Family TrustIndustry to Alaska, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE, Apr. 14, 1997, at 6
(describing new trust legislation as being "aimed at luring a multi-billion dollar industry to Alaska
... [and] intended to make the state a national and international center for administering trusts.");
see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.043 (Michie 1998) (permitting change of situs of trust to Alaska).
37. Katharine Fraser, With New Law, Alaska Aiming to be Trust Capital,AM. BANKER, Apr.
21, 1997, at 13 (quoting Alaska Rep. Al Vezey, R-North Pole).
38. See David G. Shaftel, Newest Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of Alaska
Trusts, 26 EST.PLAN. 51, 52 (1999) (noting Alaska has joined Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, South Dakota and Wisconsin as states which have abolished the rule against
perpetuities). See, .e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (Michie 1998) (abolishing the rule against
perpetuities). Query whether any of these other jurisdictions adopting such a pro-trust measure as
repeal of the rule against perpetuities might next join the asset protection bandwagon.

39. See Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 23, at 50; Shaftel, supra note 38, at 51.
40. See Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 23, at 48; Blattmachr et al, supra note 10, at
B7; Hompesch, II et al., supra note 24, at 9; Richard W. Nenno, DelawareLaw Offers Asset
ProtectionandEstatePlanningBenefits, 26 EST. PLAN. 3 (1999); Shaftel, supra note 38, at 51-52.
41. See supra note 32.
42. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9) (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT.
(Michie 1998).

§ 34.40.1 10(b)(2)
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actually removed from the trust and paid to the beneficiary.43 Such a
transfer restriction by statute "prevents a creditor existing when the trust
is created, a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or another
person from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary's interest in the trust.
. . ."" Although such creditor protection will not be available if the settlor
retains the power to revoke or terminate all or a portion of the trust without
the consent of a person possessing "a substantial beneficial interest in the
trust [which] ... would be adversely affected by the exercise of [such]
power," the statute makes clear that creditor protection will not be lost
simply because the settlor retains "the right to receive a distribution of
income, corpus, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee,
other than the settlor .... 45
The Delaware statute is similarly direct in limiting a creditor's recovery
against property that has been the subject of a "qualified disposition." 46 A
"qualified disposition" is defined to include transfers (1) to a trustee having
the requisite Delaware contacts; (2) under an irrevocable trust instrument;
which (3) incorporates Delaware law as governing the validity,
construction and administration of the trust; and which (4) "[p]rovides that
the interest of the transferoror other beneficiary in the trust property or
the income therefrom may not be transferred, assigned, pledged or
mortgaged, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before the... qualified
trustees actually distribute the property or income therefrom to the
beneficiary... ."' The statute further provides that a trust will not be
deemed revocable (a circumstance that would thwart the available creditor
protection) notwithstanding the settlor's "potential or actual receipt of
income, including rights to such income retained in the trust instrument;
or [the settlor's] potential or actual receipt of principal if such potential or
actual receipt of principal is either in the sole discretion of... qualified
trustees or is pursuant to an ascertainable standard contained in the trust
instrument.... 48

43. See ALAsKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a) (Michie 1998).
44. ALAsKASTAT. § 34.40.110(b).
45. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2). The statute is less than artfully drafted in allowing the
settlor to be a creditor-protected beneficiary, doing so by implication in defining a power to revoke

or terminate as not including "a power to veto a distribution from the trust, a testamentary special
power of appointment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of income, corpus, or
both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the settlor... .." Id.
46. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) & (b) (Supp. 1998).
47. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9) (emphasis added).
48. DEL CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(b)(3) & (4). See infra note 222 and accompanying text
(regarding the transfer tax concerns and the avoidance of inclusion of trust property in the settlor's
estate, any interest in income or principal should be limited to distributions in the absolute
discretion of the trustee, notwithstanding creditor protection issues).
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B. Required Trustees and Governing Law
Both Alaska and Delaware have designed their statutes to increase trust
business within the respective states, by imposing certain trustee and
administration requirements upon the creditor-protected trust. 49 These prolocal business requirements also collaterally enhance the asset protective
features of a trust by increasing the likelihood that the settlor's stated
choice of Alaska or Delaware governing law will be honored.5" "The
framers of the new [Alaska] statutory trust provisions considered that
persons located outside Alaska may well be interested in using Alaska selfsettled spendthrift trusts .

. .

. Consequently, they enacted statutory

requirements which the framers thought would provide an adequate Alaska
nexus so that Alaska law would apply to the trust."51
In Alaska, this local "nexus" has been pursued in part by providing that
an Alaska choice of law provision shall be "valid, effective, and conclusive
for the trust if... some or all of the trust assets are deposited in [Alaska]
and are being administered by a qualified person" having a minimum level
of specified trustee powers over the trust.5 2 A "qualified person" is a
designated trustee who is an individual resident of Alaska, certain trust
companies having a principal place of business in Alaska, or a bank having
trustee powers under Alaska law and maintaining a principal place of
business in Alaska.5 3 The minimum powers of this local trustee with
respect to a particular trust must include the power to "maintain[] records
for the trust on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis; and...
prepar[e] or arrang[e] for the preparation of, on an exclusive basis or ' a4
nonexclusive basis, an income tax return that must be filed by the trust.
Finally, part or all of the administration of the trust must occur in Alaska.55
There is no statutory prohibition against other non-Alaskan persons serving
as co-trustee with the required local fiduciary.5 6 Thus, it is entirely possible
for an out-of-state settlor to utilize someone closer to home as a co-trustee

49. See Shaftel, supra note 38, at 52.
50. See id.
51. Id.; see also Nenno, supra note 40, at 8 ("The use of non-Delaware trustees would
increase the trust's susceptibility to service of process in other jurisdictions and the possibility that
Delaware law might be found not to govern the trust, or more importantly, the rights ofbeneficiaries
and their creditors.").
52. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (Michie 1998). As discussed in more detail in subsequent
parts of this article, this Alaska legislative declaration of the law that shall govern such a trust may
or may not be respected by courts in other states.

53. See id. § 13.36.390(1).
54. Id. § 13.36.035(c)(3).
55. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(4).
56. See ad §§ 13.36320(a)(1), 13.36390; see also Shaftel, supra note 38, at 51 ("[A]s long
as there is at least one Alaska trustee, then non-Alaskan individuals, trust companies, and banks
may serve as co-trustees .... ).
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to share in investment and/or distribution decisions.
Similarly, Delaware has provided that in order to enjoy the full assetprotective benefits of Delaware law, the trust agreement must designate a
"qualified trustee," defined to include individual Delaware residents (other
than the settlor) or entities subject to supervision by one of several
specified Delaware regulatory bodies. 7 Like the Alaska trustee under that
state's legislation, the Delaware trustee must maintain or arrange for
custody in Delaware of some or all of the trust property, maintain records
for the trust on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis, prepare or arrange for
the preparation of fiduciary income tax returns for the trust, "or otherwise
materially participate[] in the administration of the trust." 8 The Delaware
scheme is again more explicit than Alaska in providing that the settlor may
designate non-resident "advisors" or "protectors" who under the trust
agreement may be given the authority "to remove and appoint qualified
trustees or trust advisers... [and] to direct, consent to or disapprove
distributions from the trust.... ,,."
In addition, the settlor may serve solely
as an investment advisor without jeopardizing the statutorily granted
spendthrift nature of the trust.' As noted above, one of the Delaware
requirements for a "qualified disposition" is that the trust instrument
expressly incorporate Delaware law as 61governing the "validity,
construction and administration of the trust.
Thus, the statutory schemes of Delaware and Alaska make clear that
any self-settled DAPT created in one of thosejurisdictions will have (1) at
least one local trustee; (2) a choice of local governing law provision with
respect to the construction, validity and administration of the trust; (3)
some portion of the trust property held in the applicable state; and (4) some
portion of the administration of the trust taking place within the applicable
state.62 There may, however, be other nonresidents involved in the
administration of such a trust. All of these points may prove significant if
the asset-protective features of such a trust are challenged in another
jurisdiction.
C. FraudulentTransfersandLimitations Periods
Any transfer to an Alaska or Delaware trust will be invalid, and the
asset protective features of the trust will be of no avail, if the transfer of
property to the trust was fraudulent under general principles of fraudulent

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(8)(a) (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 3570(8)(b).
Id. § 3570(8)(c).
See id. § 3570(8)(d).
Id. § 3570(9)(a).
See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Val. 52

conveyance law. 63 However, both Alaska and Delaware have tightened the

63. See ALAsKASTAT. § 34.40.110o(b)(1) (Michie 1998) (protection not availableif "transfer
was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons under"
Alaska's fraudulent transfer laws); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (Supp. 1998) (qualified
disposition may be avoided under Delaware fraudulent transfer laws); id. § 3536(b) (spendthrift
provisions not valid to protect property which has been fraudulently transferred).
The Alaska fraudulent transfers statute is fairly simplistic and does not appear to be modeled
after either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act or the more recent and more widely adopted
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection and Jurisdiction
Selection, 33 U. MIAMI SCH. OF L. PHILLI E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1404.7(B) (Tina
HestromPortundo ed., 1999) (discussing Alaskafraudulent transfer laws). Similar to those Uniform
Acts, however, the Alaska statute basically provides that transfers are void if
made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons oftheir
lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence
of debt given, action commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like
intent, as against the persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded ....
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (Michie 1998).
The Delaware fraudulent transfers provisions are based upon the Uniform FraudulentTransfers
Act, which has to date been adopted by most American states. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
supra,
TRANSFER AcT (1984) 7A Pt. II U.LA. 266,266-67 (1999). See generallyOsborne et al.,
I 1404.7(C) (discussing Delaware fraudulent transfer laws). The Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act
provides in part:
§ 4. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors.
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent valuein exchange for the
transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due.
(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration maybe
given, among other factors, to whether
(2)
(3)
(4)

.

the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;,
the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
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period within which an action may be brought to challenge the settlor's
funding of a self-settled DAPT. Specifically, under the Alaska statute no
"cause of action or claim for relief' may be pursued by persons who were
already creditors of the settlor at the time of the transfer to the trust, unless
brought within four years of the transfer or within one year after the
transfer could reasonably have been discovered. 64 As to persons who
became creditors of the settlor after the transfer of property to the trust was
made, the action must be brought within four years of the transfer.65
Delaware law is virtually identical, although identity of the creditor for
purposes of applying the applicable limitations period is tied to when the
"creditor's claim against the transferor arose," rather than to the date such
(5)

the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;...

(7)
(8)

the debtor removed or concealed assets;
the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred.

4 5. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present Creditors.
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the
debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider
for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the
insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.

§ 7. Remedies of Creditors.
(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this [Act], a
creditor... may obtain:
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to
satisfy the creditor's claim....
UNnORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr §§ 4, 5, 7 (1984), 7A Pt. II U.L.A. 301-02, 330, 339-40
(1999).
64. ALsKASTAT. § 34.403110(d)(1) (Michie 1998).
65. See id. § 34.40.1 10(d)(2).
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person becomes a creditor. 66 Interestingly, the Nevada legislature has opted
for a more internationally competitive two-year limitations period.67
D. Other Exceptions
Obviously, if a settlor-beneficiary reserves an absolute right to receive
income or principal from a trust, as opposed to a mere right to receive
distributions in the discretion of a third-party trustee, the settlor's
unfettered right will be subject to attachment by creditors and the trust will
thus be ineffective as an asset protection vehicle to the extent of the
retained mandatory distribution entitlement.68 Moreover, in addition to the
potential for setting aside a transfer to a self-settled DAPT under the
applicable fraudulent transfer rules within the limitations period stated,
both Alaska and Delaware have provided for other exceptions to the assetprotective features of trusts created under their statutes. 69 From both a
public policy and transfer tax planning standpoint, the differences between
the Alaska and Delaware exceptions are significant. For example, in
Delaware a settlor-beneficiary may not assert the asset-protective features
of a qualified disposition so as to defeat the claim of a dependent spouse
or child for support, or the claims of certain tort plaintiffs suffering injury
prior to the date of the qualified disposition.70 Thus, and as discussed in
more detail below, it may be impossible for a settlor to make a transfer to
a Delaware DAPT and thereafter have the Delaware DAPT assets excluded
from the settlor's gross estate, since a narrow but significant exception to
the limitations upon the rights of creditors to reach trust property will
always be present.7 '
66. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b)(2) (Supp. 1998).
67. NEV. REV. STAT. § 166 (Assembly Bill No. 469, § 1) (Michie 1999).
68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.1 10(b)(3) (excepting from asset protective features of
act any trust interest that is a mandatory right to income or principal); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
3570(9)(b)(3) & (4) (Supp. 1998) (limiting settlor's interest to discretionary distributions).
69. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573 (Supp. 1998).

70. See id. (providing in relevant part that the following persons are not subject to a
"qualified disposition" and thus may avoid the asset-protective features thereof: "any person to
whom the transferor is indebted on account of an agreement or order of court for the payment of
support or alimony in favor of such transferor's spouse, former spouse or children, or for a division
or distribution of property in favor of such transferor's spouse or former spouse, to the extent of
such debt; or... any person who suffers death, personal injury or property damage on or before the
date of a qualified disposition by a transferor, which death, personal injury or property damage is
at any time determined to have been caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of either such
transferor or by another person for whom such transferor is or was vicariously liable").
71. See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. Hompesch, II, Alaska v. Delaware:
Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32, 36
(concluding that this provision would cause all assets in a Delaware DAPT to be included in the
settlor's gross estate, whereas a different result would pertain under the Alaska statute); see also
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (as Amended in 1960) ("The 'use, possession... or other enjoyment
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In contrast, the Alaska legislature has seen fit to provide an exception
for dependent children only, and even in that case only if "at the time of the
transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days of making a payment
due under a child support judgment or order."' 2 Nevada has apparently
chosen to be even more competitive by providing for no statutory creditor
exceptions to the self-settled spendthrift trust features of its legislation.
However, relevant to both the Nevada and Alaska statutes is one
commentator's opinion that the Delaware
exception for alimony, child support, and property division is
an exception that would almost certainly exist even if it were
not in the statute because it is highly unlikely that any court in
the U.S. would permit a child to go without support while the
settlor/parent was living-perhaps very well-on funds

received from a retained interest in trust.73

E. "Bells and Whistles"
Alaska and Delaware have taken other steps to enhance the assetprotective features of their legislation. Both states limit the exposure of
trustees and other advisors. In Alaska, this is accomplished by legislative
dictate that the statutory spendthrift language not only protects the settlorbeneficiary's interest in the trust, but also
prevents a [pre-existing or future] creditor ...

or another

person from asserting any cause of action or claim for relief
against a trustee of the trust or against others involved in the
preparation or funding of the trust for conspiracy to commit

of the transferred property' is considered as having been retained by... the decedent to the extent
that the use, possession ... or other enjoyment is to be applied toward the discharge of a legal

obligation of the decedent. The term 'legal obligation' includes a legal obligation to support a
dependent during the decedent's lifetime."). Query how this affects the settlor having no minor
children or spouse at the time of transfer.
72. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.1 10(b)(4) (Michie 1998). This meager exception has led one
author to comment that "Macy's bills and child support do not have the same bite, except maybe
in Alaska." Dobris, supra note 34, at 555.
73. Nenno, supra note 40, at 3, 8; see also Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 23, at 48,
56 n.31 ("An Alaska trust could not be used to avoid child support or alimony payments because
neither a judgment for child support nor one for alimony is dischargeable in bankruptcy." (citing
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)). Cf.11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (providing that state spendthrift trustinterests are
exempt from the claims of bankruptcy creditors if such interests constitute an "applicable

nonbankruptcy" restriction under state law). But see Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 71, at 32,
36 (concluding that availability of trust assets to satisfy dependent's support claim is likely to cause

all assets in a Delaware DAPT to be included in the settlor's gross estate, whereas a different result
would pertain under the Alaska statute).
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fraudulent conveyance, aiding and abetting a fraudulent
conveyance, or participation in the trust transaction.7"
Recourse is expressly limited in such case to the settlor and, to the extent
the conveyance was fraudulent, the trust assets. 75 The Delaware legislature
was perhaps a bit more reserved in providing simply that a transfer "shall
not be treated as fraudulent or otherwise contrary to law for [] purposes of
any action against any trustee or any [trust] adviser...
unless it is shown
76
that such trustee or adviser acted in bad faith.,,
Delaware has gone one step further by expressly providing that its
spendthrift trust provisions are intended to be a restriction on transfer of
the settlor' s beneficial interest in the trust under applicable nonbankruptcy
law, as provided under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). 7 The Alaska provisions
would likely also be deemed such a restriction.
Alaska is apparently unique in providing that even where a trust is set
aside on one of the grounds noted above (e.g., the transfers to the trust
were fraudulent), a trustee not acting in bad faith
has a first and paramount lien against the property that is the
subject of the trust in an amount equal to the entire cost,
including attorney fees, properly incurred by the trustee in a
defense of the action or proceedings to void or set aside the
trust or the property transfer . . .[and] the beneficiary,
including the settlor, may retain a distribution made by
exercising a trust power or discretion.
7
This first lien in favor of the trustee may encourage a vigorous defense
against creditor claims and perhaps provide an additional psychological
disincentive for creditors to seek recovery against trust assets, although the
costs to the trust beneficiaries (and the settlor's wealth transfer plan) could
be significant as well.
Thus, both Alaska and Delaware have enacted carefully crafted
legislation which on its face permits the establishment of a self-settled
spendthrift trust that will not be subject to the claims of the settlor's

74. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.110(e) (Michie 1998).
75. See id.
76. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(d) (Supp. 1998).
77. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(c). 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) provides: "A restriction
on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under [Title 11 of the U.S. Code]." § 541(c)(2). For
examples of the application of this provision in the context of a debtor's self-settled trust, see
Dzikowski v. Cameron (In re Cameron), 223 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998), and Marine
MidlandBank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
78. ALAsKASTAT. § 13.36.310(c) (Michie 1998).
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creditors where certain threshold conditions are satisfied. Both states have
included governing law provisions and situs/administration requirements
which may enhance the likelihood that the touted creditor protection
benefits will in fact be achieved. However, mere satisfaction with the
wording of the domestic statutes is hardly the end of the inquiry.
VI. EFFECTIVENS OF ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
A good deal of the literature concerning the new domestic APT
legislation has been written by persons having, to one degree or another,
a vested interest in the acceptance of that legislation.79 However, it appears
to be widely recognized that for constitutional and practical reasons, a trust
created under domestic statutes cannot provide the same degree of asset
protection afforded by an offshore APT:
It is impossible for any state in the U.S. to offer the same
degree of protection as offshore jurisdictions that have high
burdens of proof, virtually no recognition of foreign
judgments, the English rule for taxing attorney's fees as costs,
and extremely short limitations periods in which to seek
avoidance of a transfer claimed to be fraudulent.80

79. For example, authors Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Richard Twaites, Jr. are or were
shareholders in Alaska Trust Co. See Rose Ragsdale, Alaska Trust Stakes Claim to Service Niche

in Banking Territory,21 ALASKA J. OF COM., Apr. 21, 1997, at l (discussing Alaska Trust Co. and
its principals); see also Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., New Alaska TrustAct ProvidesMany Estate
PlanningOpportunities,24 EST. PLAN. 347, 347 (1997) [hereinafter New Alaska]; Blattmachr et

al., supra note 10, at B5 (Douglas Blattmachr is President and C.E.O. of Alaska Trust Co.);
Blattmachr& Hompesch, supranote7l, at 32 (Douglas Blattmachr and Alaskaattorney Hompesch,
touting thebenefits of the Alaska legislation over Delaware law's shortcomings); Nenno, supra note
40, at n.al (author listed as Vice President and Trust Counsel for Wilmington Trust Company,
Wilmington, Delaware). This is not to imply that the literature is by any means either inaccurate or
of only promotional value. Indeed, some of the literature is quite informative and has been coauthored by nationally prominent authors in the estate planning field. See, e.g., Blattmachr et al.,
supra note 10 (Howard M. Zaritsky, co-author, has written several treatises on estate planning.).
However, some statements are perhaps alittle too optimistic, at least given the current uncertainties
discussed herein, regarding the potential utilization of the new domestic statutes. See, e.g., James
L. Dam, New Trusts Will Offer EstateTax Breaks,Protectionfrom Creditors,LAWYERS WEEKLY

U.S.A., Apr. 21, 1997 (quoting Jonathan G. Blattmachr, "Ifyou're making a significant gift, I don't
know why you wouldn't use an Alaska trust....").
80. Nenno, supra note 40, at 8-9; see also SPERO, supra note 21, 1 6.08(5) ("[Tlrusts

established under these laws are vulnerable to creditor attack where the settlor/beneficiary is not
a resident of one of those states."); Giordani, supra note 9, at app. B (detailed discussion of
potential weaknesses in domestic legislation); Osborne et al., supranote 63 (same); Hompesch, II
et al., supranote 24, at 9("An Alaska trust... will not provide the additional practical barriers that
are often present with respect to [foreign APT's]."). Credit is due those previously described as
having a vested interest in the domestic legislation, for their straightforward acknowledgment of
this reality. See, e.g., Hompesch, II et al.,
supra note 24, at 9 (Jonathan Blattmachr, co-author,
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A. UncertaintyImpacts Transfer Tax Planning
The legal susceptibility of a self-settled DAPT to the settlor' s creditors'
claims is far from clear, by virtue of the interaction between the strong
protection which the drafters have attempted to include in the domestic
legislation and the apparent merit to some of the recognized potential
weaknesses of such legislation."1 Nevertheless, absent a new body of case
law or other authority indicating that a DAPT will not provide the
promised protection, the DAPT presents new possibilities for transfer tax
planning situations.8 2 Even if future developments establish definitively
that DAPTs are fairly weak (relative to OAPTs) as asset protection
vehicles, the potential merits of DAPTs as transfer tax planning vehicles
should not be ignored. At the very least, the DAPT presents a new element
to be considered and discussed with clients in devising a transfer tax
planning strategy. This is particularly true for settlors residing in Alaska or
Delaware since, in the context of resolving a creditor's claim against trust
assets, the arguments for applying a different state's laws and public policy
will be much weaker than in the case of a nonresident debtor and
nonresident creditors.8 3
The existence of various theories upon which such DAPT legislation
might be respected or ignored renders the analysis difficult from the
transfer tax planning standpoint. This difficulty expands upon
consideration that in a litigated transfer tax dispute in which estate
inclusion of trust property is sought by the IRS, the IRS will likely be
forced to argue the rights of a hypothetical (as opposed to actual) creditor,"
which makes it more difficult to predict the court's likely concern for the
various theories under which the asset protection features of the DAPT
legislation might be honored or ignored. This is because many of those
theories turn on public policy and possibly constitutional considerations
that are difficult to fully appreciate where there is no actual creditor
comparing domestic APT benefits to those offered by an offshore APT).
81. See, e.g., CASNER &PENNELL, supra note 12,9 4.1.4 n.23 ("It is too early to determine
whether creditors from states other than Alaska or Delaware will be able to obtain judgments
against the trust that an Alaska or Delaware court will respect .....
82. See infra note 127, and accompanying text; see also New Alaska, supra note 79

(discussing various uses of a DAPT for transfer tax planning purposes).
83. See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 71, at 36 ("The greatest degree of certainty may
be achieved by an Alaska domiciliary transferring her assets located in Alaska to an Alaska trust
and having an Alaska trustee alone hold the power to make or withhold distributions.").
84. Or stated differently, the IRS would be arguing the rights of creditors generally. This
concept is also addressed to some extent in Marty-Nelson, supra note 5, at 431-37, wherein the

author points out that "[c]reditor access cases fall into two categories: (1) cases where a creditor
is a party (i.e., 'genuine' creditor access cases), and (2) cases where a creditor is not a party (usually
tax disputes involving the Service and the settlor or the settlor's estate." Id. at 431.
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harmed by the transfer to the self-settled spendthrift trust and no actual
judgment, the enforcement of which is sought.
Moreover, in the likely IRS transfer tax dispute argument asserted
against the estate of a settlor/decedent residence of a non-DAPT state,
there would be no actual debtor-creditor relationship to point to as
enhancing the nexus between the trust transaction and the settlor's
domiciliary non-DAPT jurisdiction whose law or public policy might
otherwise be applied on the basis of that relationship." Similarly, there
would be no creditor party whose "expectations" might be cited in
determining the most appropriate choice of governing law. It is difficult to
believe that in such a situation the court hearing a transfer tax dispute
would simply concoct a scenario under which the asset protection features
of the DAPT might fail, and therefore hold that trust property is includible
in the decedent settlor's gross estate on that basis.86
Perhaps the courts would look to the nature of the actual creditors of the
decedent-settlor's estate as indicative of the considerations at issue,
notwithstanding the potential lack of any unsatisfied creditor claim, in
delineating the appropriate creditors' rights considerations. Alternatively,
the scenario could be imagined where an actual creditor is pursuing trust
assets simultaneously with the litigation of a transfer tax dispute, thus
providing at least one situation which could demonstrate to the court the
protection afforded by the DAPT. The more likely approach, given the
policies underlying estate inclusion based on creditors' rights, 87 is that the
courts would look to the rights of creditors generally-herein described as
the hypothetical creditor-which in itself raises questions as to how far the
courts in transfer tax disputes might go beyond the literal wording of the
"applicable" state law to discern a circumstance under which the promised
asset protection features of the trust would fail.
The possibilities likely to be entertained by the courts in a transfer tax
dispute are discussed in more detail below. However, before considering
such issues, it is appropriate first to understand the potential shortcomings
and purported strengths of the DAPT legislation.

85. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that New York law, rather than law stated in trust, should govern
creditors' rights, based on closer nexus to settlor and creditors). The parameters of this conflicts of
law issue are discussed more fully in Part VI.B.3., infra.
86. The likelihood of such a result is simply another way to view the discussion which
follows in the text, infra, as to the level of analysis likely to be applied by the courts in hearing a
transfer tax dispute involving only a hypothetical creditor. In other words, references to the courts'
likely approach to the hypothetical creditor situation is similarly postulating the degree to which
the courts will entertain-or deem relevant-the possibility of the DAPT failing to deliver the
desired level of asset protection.
87. See infra text accompanying note 147.
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B. Strengths and Weaknesses of DAPTs
Despite the uncertainties and numerous potential creditor scenarios, it
is nevertheless important to consider the reasons why a domestic APT
might not offer full asset protection to a settlor-beneficiary."
1. Fraudulent Transfers
Asset protection is not afforded a settlor whose transfer of property to
the trust constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Creditors need only establish
within the jurisdiction's applicable limitations period that a transfer to the
trust was fraudulent and should therefore be voided, thus effectively
bringing the implicated trust property back into the settlor's hands for
attachment by creditors. The Delaware and Alaska legislation provide
some degree of debtor-friendly protection in this regard by providing for
a reasonably
short limitations period in which such challenges may be
89
brought.

88. It is not the author's purpose to present novel arguments which might be asserted by a
settlor-beneficiary's creditors in attempting to recover against the assets of a self-settled DAPT.
Rather, the above discussion is an attempt to summarize the potential weaknesses in DAPT's as
asset protection vehicles, as necessary background to be appreciated (and disclosed to clients) when
utilizing DAPT's in the estate and gift tax context hereinafter discussed. For a concise yet thorough
discussion of the potential weaknesses in these domestic statutes, see Giordani, supranote 9, app.
B. Another very detailed discussion of these issues can be found in recent ALI-ABA CLE materials.
See Karen Gebbia-Pinetti,As CertainAsDebtand Taxes:EstatePlanning,Asset-ProtectionTrusts,
and ConflictingStateLaw, SC60 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 179, 185-203 (1998) (This article was prepared for
the 1998 Advanced Estate Planning Techniques Seminar). Also recommended on the topic of
creditor access to the assets held in an APT include Osborne et al., supra note 63,1 1404, and Alan
R. Jahde & Michael P. Franzmann, What Are Creditors'RightsAgainst Asset ProtectionTrusts,
26 EST. PLAN. 410 (1999). Recent creditor challenges brought in the United States Bankruptcy
courts against OAPTs are discussed in Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Offshore
Trusts-OnshoreLitigation, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 29-32. The author has relied to
some extent upon all of these sources and those cited elsewhere in Part V of this Article in
formulating the discussion set forth in Part V of this Article. The author's primary contribution lies
in the characterization of these arguments and their impact upon transfer tax planning.
89. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text with regard to the limitations periods
provided under the Alaska and Delaware statutes. In this regard, note that a non-DAPTjurisdiction
may not necessarily be bound by the limitations period established under the DAPTjurisdiction's
laws. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.32(4) (3d ed. 1999)
(noting that a state can "apply its own [statute of] limitations to claims governed by another state's
substantive laws without violating either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process
Clause.") (citations omitted). For a discussion of the issues arising under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Due Process Clause in the context of DAPT's, see infratext accompanying notes
94-98.
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2. Constitutional Concerns
All matters concerning domestic asset protection trust legislation and
its effectiveness will be subject to considerations arising under the U.S.
Constitution.' One constitutional argument can be made only with respect
to creditors whose claims arose prior to the transfer to the DAPT.
Specifically, the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution can be asserted
to invalidate laws which impair contractual obligations, such as those
between a debtor and a creditor.9" One author considers this avenue of
attack as "probably the only viable Constitutional claim that could
potentially obliterate the new [domestic] asset protection trust laws."9 2
However, it would seem that such an argument is tenuous, at best, except
as to those creditors able to show that a specific contractual right (as
opposed only to a remedy) with regard to the property held by the DAPT
has been defeated.9 3
The most often cited constitutional clause proffered in recognition of
the potential weakness of the DAPT legislation is the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,9 4 which imposes upon each state an
"obligation to recognize and enforce the judgments of the courts of sister
states."95 This would be relevant, for example, where a trust is created and
administered under the laws of a DAPT jurisdiction and thereafter a
judgment is entered against the DAPT settlor-beneficiary by a non-DAPT
state having jurisdiction over the settlor-beneficiary-as might be the case,
for example, where a New York settlor creates an Alaska DAPT and a
judgment is thereafter entered against the settlor by a New York court.
Upon delivery of the judgment to the DAPT jurisdiction's courts for
enforcement, multiple issues arise, both in favor of and against the
effectiveness of the DAPT legislation. For example, although most
commentators acknowledge that the DAPT state could be found in
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause if it were to refuse to enforce
the judgment entered by the non-DAPT state's court, considerable
questions arise as to the manner of enforcement. In such a case, "[ilt is not

90. The same is not so when an OAPT is at issue. For others noting this obvious conclusion,

see SPERO, supranote 21, 16.08(4); Giordani, supranote 9, at W62; Osborne et al., supra note 63,

11404.

91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
92. Giordani, supra note 9, at app. B at W-70; see also Osborne et al., supra note 63, [
1404.6 (Giordani and co-authors echoing this sentiment). But see SPERO, supranote 21,[I6.08(4)
(discussing contract clause in context of self-settled APT's, and noting case law that may weaken

contract clause argument).
93. See Giordani, supra note 9, at app. B at W-69; see also SPERO, supranote 21,9[ 6.08(5)
(discussing contract clause arguments).
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
95. 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACNICE § 108.10 (3d ed. 1998).
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clear... just what the courts of other states would be bound to do. The
priorjudgment would not affect directly interests in the [trust] property nor
would it impose obligations on the trustee."' More specifically, the forum
(non-APT) state must have jurisdiction "over the particular person or
property in question" to enter a valid judgment entitled to enforcement
against such person or property under full faith and credit principles.97
Personal jurisdiction over a trustee in this context would require that the
trustee have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state, and that
the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction over the trustee "be the
foreseeable result of the [trustee's] own purposeful conduct, not simply

96. VA AUSTINWAKEMANSCOTr&W.LIAMF. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 573 (4th
ed. 1989) [hereinafter VA Sco'rT & FRATCHER] (discussing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958)). In Hanson, the Supreme Court held that a Florida judgment based on the application of
Florida law need not be honored by the courts of Delaware, which jurisdiction was the one in which
the trustee and trust property were located and pursuant to which laws the trust was being
administered. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 255. Although noting that the Florida judgment was void
for lack of jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee or the trust property, Scott and Fratcher point out
that the Supreme Court in dicta:
seems to intimate that a court having jurisdiction over some of the beneficiaries
can render a valid judgment as to the validity of the trust that would be binding as
between those beneficiaries and perhaps ...other states would be bound to give
full faith and credit to the judgment. It is not clear, however, just what the courts
of other states would be bound to do. The prior judgment would not affect directly
interests inthe property nor would it impose obligations on the trustee.... [Scott
and Fratcher go on to note that] ... it may well be argued that the Delaware court
would not be bound by the Florida judgment even [if] the Florida court had
jurisdiction over the trustee also. A court might acquire jurisdiction over an
individual trustee who happened to be in the state or over a corporate trustee [with
minimum contacts with the forum state] or the trustee might appear in the action.
It is submitted that thejudgment would nevertheless be an undue interference with
the administration of the trust by the Delaware courts.
VA ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra, § 573. It should be noted, however, that the self-serving language
in the Alaska and Delaware statutes concerning choice of governing law is not necessarily entitled
to full faith and credit in a non-DAPT jurisdiction, as full faith and credit is a concept applicable
to the validity and enforcement of out-of-statejudgments, not statutes. See Giordani, supra note 9,
app. B, at W-70 (noting this limitation); Osborne et al., supra note 63, 1 1404.6 ("[F]ull faith and
credit does not help force the application of Alaska or Delaware law in other states. That issue is
resolved under conflicts of laws principles.").
97. 16 MOORE, supra note 95, § 108.03. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254-56
(1958) (holding that state oftrustee domicile was not bound to give full faith and credit to judgment
rendered by state of settlor's and most beneficiaries' domicile, where second state lacked personal
jurisdiction over trustee); see also 16 MOORE,supra note 95, § 130.06[2] ("If the court that
rendered the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction ... that defect ... renders the judgment
'absolutely void.' Enforcement... would violate due process of law."). A good discussion of the
jurisdictional and procedural issues which arise in this context is also set forth in SPERO, supranote
21,-1 6.08(5)(b).
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that of... third parties [such as the settlor]."9 8 If the forum state has

jurisdiction over the trustee and/or trust property, then the DAPT is clearly
vulnerable.
However, proponents of the DAPT's effectiveness would emphasize
the interests of the DAPT state having more significant contacts with the
administration of the trust, and in the well-designed DAPT scenario,
having more obvious jurisdiction over the trustee and the assets held in
trust. For example, the jurisdiction under which the DAPT has been
established could protect the trust assets while still enforcing a judgment
againstthe settlor,since such ajudgment would not necessarily dictate the
assets from which the judgment is to be satisfied.9 9 Of course, this would

not be the case if the non-DAPT state were to simultaneously hold the trust
invalid and purport to dictate that trust assets belong to the settlor and thus
constitute assets from which the judgment is to be satisfied.1°°
The trustee's contacts with the non-DAPT state and the location of trust
property are therefore crucial considerations in the establishment and
administration of any APT, as the wrong decision here could mitigate
strongly in favor of the judgment creditor.101 Thus, a primary consideration
for both the asset protection attorney and the transfer tax planning attorney
is the selection of a trustee with a policy of minimizing personal
jurisdiction contacts with states other than the DAPT jurisdiction, the laws
of which are intended to govern trust affairs. If such personal jurisdiction
is found to exist and due process requirements are otherwise complied
with, the asset protection sought could easily be lost as a result of litigation
in the non-DAPT jurisdiction.
3. Choice of Laws
The settlor may usually designate in the trust instrument the state law
which is to govern the trust, and a DAPT created under Alaska or
Delaware law is required to include a provision designating that state's
98. 16 MOORE, supra note 95, § 108.32 (discussing Hanson v. Denckla).
99. See Giordani, supra note 9, app. B, at W65-66 (noting that creditor obtaining judgment
against settlor must still seek to enforce the judgment against trust assets).
100. See Part VI.B.3., infra.
101. In this regard, it is interesting to note that an "Alaska trustee" does not guarantee
immunity from the jurisdiction of non-Alaska courts. For example, it appears that a non-Alaska
corporation will act as custodian of clients' liquid assets entrusted to Alaska Trust Co. See Rose
Ragsdale,AlaskaTrust Stakes Claim to Service Niche in Banking Territory,21 ALASKAJ. OF COM.
Apr. 21, 1997, at 1 (noting relationship between D.A. Davidson & Co., with offices in four states,
and AlaskaTrust Co.). It appears that at least one other potential corporate Alaska trustee may have
significant out-of-state contacts. See KeyTrust Company National Association, Anchorage, Alaska,
Promotional Materials, which may be obtained by calling (800) 982-3811 (KeyTrust is "an affiliate
of KeyTrust Company of Ohio...."). A good discussion of thejurisdictional and procedural issues
which arise in this context is set forth in SPERO, supra note 21, 6.08(5)(b).
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laws as governing.' 1 If the law of the DAPT jurisdiction is respected and
applied, the DAPT should generally be effective in preserving the trust
assets from claims of the settlor's creditors. However, if an action is
brought against a settlor-beneficiary in a non-DAPT forum which has
jurisdiction over the settlor, that non-DAPT forum may find the self-settled
DAPT a violation of its state's public policy, and, therefore, the forum
court may apply the laws of the state in which it sits and refuse to
recognize the trust as a valid protection against the claims of the settlor's
creditors. 3 It is widely accepted that a choice of law provision may be
ignored where the laws of the expressly chosen jurisdiction offend the
of the forum state in which a legal action concerning the trust
public policy
10 4
is brought.
Several bankruptcy court decisions demonstrate how this line of
reasoning might apply in the case of an.offshore APT, and such reasoning
could be equally applicable in a case concerning the new domestic
legislation,I 5 although some argue thejustifications for such a result would
be more limited were a DAPT involved." 6 For example, the court in Sattin
102. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 15, § 301. With respect to Alaska and Delaware
governing law provisions, see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
103. See generallyBOGERT&BOGERT, supranote 15, §§ 291 & 301; VASCOTT&FRATCHER,
supra note 96, § 573; Marty-Nelson, supra notel 1, at 49-50. There is some difference of opinion
as to whether the conflicts of law question is properly resolved by reference RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971), which addresses the validity of a trust generally, or
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OFLAWS § 273, which addresses the more specific question of
whether a spendthrift provision restraining a beneficiary's ability to alienate an interest in the trust
property, will be given effect. CompareHenzy, supranote 2, at 747-53 (arguing that the court may
apply non-DAPT forum law to invalidate trust where self-settled spendthrift provision violates
forum states public policy), with Rothschild et al., supranote 4, at 768-69 (arguing that Brooks and
Portnoycourts misconstrued the conflicts of law issue, which should have been resolved by specific
reference to validity of spendthrift provisions under settlor's choice of law, which should be given
effect without regard to public policy of forum state); Rothschild & Rubin, supra note 88, at 30
(same); Roundtable Discussion, supra note 33, at 806 (comments of Gideon Rothschild). Not
surprisingly, Henzy is a creditors' attorney, whereas Rothschild and Rubin approach the issue more
from a settlor's asset protection viewpoint with respect to the contacts a forum state should have
with the debtor-creditor relationship.
104. See, e.g., 17 MOORE, supra note 89, § 124.32(4) (noting that choice of law provisions
will not be given effect where "[a]pplication of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state... that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue."); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 15, § 301, 330 (noting
principle in trust context); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 273, discussed supra
note 103.
105. See generallyRothschild & Rubin, supranote 88 (discussing the results of several recent
bankruptcy decisions involving self-settled offshore APTs); but see Rothschild et al., supra note
4, at 763 (criticizing bankruptcy court analysis of conflicts of law issue as driven by "bad facts").
106. See Hompesch, II et al., supra note 24, at 9 (arguing that the logic of such bankruptcy
decisions should not apply with equal force in the context of a domestic trust). The authors of the
Hompesch article note that the courts in such bankruptcy cases faced "exceptional facts" and the
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v. Brooks (In re Brooks) held that spendthrift provisions set forth in Jersey
(Channel Islands) and Bermuda trusts funded with property transferred by
a U.S. debtor-beneficiary were unenforceable under Connecticut law,
which the court found to be applicable notwithstanding contrary choice of
law provisions in the governing instruments."T A similar decision was
reached by the bankruptcy court in MarineMidlandBank v. Portnoy (In re
Portnoy)where the court similarly refused to honor the settlor's choice of
(foreign) law provision and held that property of the offshore trust was
includible in the debtor/settlor/beneficiary's bankruptcy estate. 8 In
discussing that a self-settled spendthrift trust was violative of the public
policy of New York which prohibits self-settled spendthrift trusts,"°9 and
thus refusing to honor the settlor's choice of law provision in light of that
public policy, the court in In re Portnoyspecifically noted: "it is not at all
clear what the policy behind the [offshore jurisdiction spendthrift
legislation] is except, perhaps, to augment business." 0 It is clear that
similar reasoning could easily be applied by a domestic court outside of
Alaska or Delaware in rendering a judgment against a settlor and
purportedly refusing to recognize the self-settled trust property as other
than belonging to the settlor. Indeed, the Portnoy court noted that "[a
debtor] may not unilaterally remove the characterization of property as his
simply by incorporating a favorable choice of law provision into a selfsettled trust of which he is the primary beneficiary.""' Of course, this once
again raises issues as to the forum court's jurisdiction over the trustee and
the trust assets, which is a separate inquiry from that of the forum's
selection of the applicable governing law."'
However, should a bankruptcy court sitting in a non-DAPT forum state
hold a debtor/settlor/beneficiary's DAPT ineffective under the foregoing
courts clearly wanted to reach the given result. See id. However, it is not too great a leap to say that
such logic could similarly be applied by a court confronting a transfer tax dispute where estate

inclusion is in the court's opinion the proper result, the only real question being the grounds upon
which the court will so find.
107. 217 B.R. 98, 101, 103-04 (Bankr. Conn. 1998).
108. 201 B.R. 685, 698-701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
109. This represents a change in (or perhaps a more clear declaration of) New York law since
the decision in Herzog v. Commissioner,116 F.2d 591,596 (2d Cir. 1941). See infranotes 181-86
and accompanying text.
110. 201 B.R. at 700.
111. Id.; see also VA ScOaT & FRATCHER, supra note 96, § 598 ("There are situations in
which the designation by the settlor of the governing law may be ineffective, even though he
designates a state having a substantial connection with the trust [via, e.g., trustee domicile, asset
situs, etc.]. On a particular issue of validity the ground for invalidity may rest upon such a strong
policy of a state whose law would otherwise govern that the settlor would not be permitted to avoid
the policy merely by designating another state as that of the controlling law.").
112. See 16 MOORE, supra note 95, § 108.04(4) (choice of law and jurisdiction are separate

inquiries).
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conflicts of law principles, failure of the DAPT as an asset protection
vehicle would appear to be imminent, in light of the expansive scope of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the assets and trustee of any domestic
trust.11 3 Given that a creditor proceeding against property held in a debtor's

APT will likely have doubts as to the debtor's other resources, this
bankruptcy pitfall should not be overlooked by those seeking asset
protection for debtors residing in non-DAPT states. Indeed, at least one
commentator has emphasized that "bankruptcy courts are really going to
be the battlegrounds on these [asset protection trusts].'

14

It thus seems

plausible to argue that until the movement away from the common law
prohibition against self-settled spendthrift trusts becomes more
widespread, the true significance of the domestic legislation is in the
context of transfer tax planning.
C. Other Questions
The foregoing considerations necessarily raise the question of whether
it would ever be prudent for an attorney to advise a non-DAPT state
resident to whom asset protection is of primary relevance, to utilize a
domestic trust in lieu of a trust created, administered and (at least
purportedly) governed by the laws of an offshore jurisdiction. Indeed, even
in a case resulting in a holding such as those in In re Brooks'15 and In re
Portnoy,"6 the creditors may never actually reach the assets held by the
foreign trustee in (or at least perhaps not traceable beyond) the foreign
jurisdiction. Such a result cannot be said with any degree of certainty to be
likely in the case of assets held in a DAPT established by a settlor who is
a nonresident of the DAPT jurisdiction. This is particularly so where
activities of the trustee are likely to render that trustee subject to the
jurisdiction of a state having an express public policy against recognizing
self-settled spendthrift trusts. However, where asset protection is only a
secondary consideration (which might be the case in some transfer tax
planning situations as discussed below), the domestic statutes may provide
adequate protection and do exhibit characteristics which are very relevant
in the transfer tax planning context.
Moreover, offshore APTs are not the panacea many people believe

113. See generally Henzy, supra note 2, at 745-47, 753-55 (1999) (discussing bankruptcy
court jurisdiction and full faith and credit issues); SPERO, supra note 21, 6.08[5][a] & [b][i]
(discussing conflicts of law principles and bankruptcy court jurisdiction, and in this context noting
that "[i]f the public policy issue is raised outside of Alaska or Delaware, then the asset protection
aspects of a self-settled trust will likely be invalidated.").
114. RoundtableDiscussion, supra note 33, at 785 (comments of Eric Henzy, the creditor's
attorney in the Brooks case, discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 105-12).
115. 217 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. Conn. 1998).
116. 201 B.R. 685,703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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when it comes to asset protection, and are thus not, per se, better than a
domestic APT in every given situation. For example, as the new era of
offshore APT's matures, stories have arisen of creditors successfully
realizing on their claims against the assets of such trusts.1 17 In fact, the
creditors in both In re Brooks and In re Portnoy were ultimately able to
realize to some extent upon their claims."' Moreover, that the security
afforded by OAPT's may be called into question is evidenced by a subspecialty which has developed in the field of asset protection as the flipside of the usual fare-that is, the representation of creditors attempting to
collect from assets held offshore in OAPT's.119 While it is true that a
creditor may face significant hurdles notwithstanding the invalidation of
an offshore trust arrangement, such OAPTs are not an automatic dead end
for the persistent creditor or bankruptcy trustee. For example, in In re
Brooks, primary among trust assets were stock certificates representing
interests in certain corporations organized under the laws of Connecticut. 12 0
Since the stock certificates were issued under authority of Connecticut law,
the court would arguably have the power to enforce its judgment by
voiding the certificates issued to the offshore trusts, and requiring that new
certificates be issued in favor of the bankruptcy trustee.12 1 A similar result
should obtain where OAPT investments are traceable to United States
financial markets.122
VII. ESTATE AND GiFT TAX PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
A simple concept applied in most every transfer tax planning situation
involving significant wealth is that it is more tax efficient to make current

117. See, e.g., Brigid McMenamin, Your Trust Has a Hole, FORBES, June 15, 1998, at 240
(relating stories of settlements and claims realized against offshore APT's and/or their settlors);
William Symonds, Offshore Trusts:NotSo Watertight,Bus.WK., Jul. 26,1999, at 100 (discussing
potential failings of OAPT in recent Florida and other controversies).
118. The creditor in In reBrooks recovered "approximately 50 cents on the dollar," while the
creditor in In re Portnoyrecovered "approximately 20 cents on the dollar." Rothschild & Rubin,
supra note 88, at 32.
119. See id. (noting story of Ronald Rudman, formerly a leading practitioner in the legal field
of OAPT planning, who has abandoned that practice and now "buys up seemingly hopeless claims
against people who have offshore trusts, then sets about to collect them.").
120. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101.
121. See McMenamin, supra note 117, at 240 (discussing this failure in the Brooks case, to
which the debtor's attorney could only reply "nothing went wrong with the trusts"); see also VA
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 96, § 597 (pointing out that the law of the jurisdiction in which
personal property is transferred often governs the validity of that transfer, and recommending that
a settlor travel to the jurisdiction in which the trust is to be administered in order to effect transfer
of personal property to such trust).
122. Baker, supra note 2, at 54 (relaying story of spouse able to realize $3,400,000 on trust
assets invested by foreign trustee in the United States).
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gifts than testamentary transfers. 123 This is particularly true where the
donor's applicable credit amount and annual gift tax exclusions are taken
into consideration as reducing the donor's immediate out-of-pocket
transfer tax costs, and even where there are immediate transfer tax costs,
the tax-exclusive nature of the gift tax versus the tax-inclusive nature of
the estate tax still weighs in favor of lifetime gifting. 124 Another important
advantage of lifetime gifting is that post-transfer appreciation in the value
of gifted property will escape transfer taxation at the progressively
increasing transfer tax rates, if the gift is properly structured so that the
gifted property is not included in the donor's taxable estate at death. Recent
reductions in the capital gains tax rate enhance this accepted principle by
discounting the value of the foregone basis step-up at death, relative to the
potential capital gains tax likely to be imposed upon the sale of appreciated
assets by the donee subsequent to the date of the gift.
Nevertheless, an equally simple concept which is often times more
difficult for a client to accept is that property must be given away
absolutely and without retained interests in order for the gift to be complete
and the property not to be subject to inclusion in the donor's taxable estate
at death."2 Traditionally, this has meant that a donor-such as the settlor
of a trust--could not gift property in trust and retain a right to distributions
from the trust through the date of death, at least not if the gift was intended
to remove property from the donor's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes. This is particularly so in light of the widely accepted
Restatement rule which prohibits self-settled spendthrift trusts and, thus,
renders the assets of such trusts subject to the claims of the settlor's
creditors.126 Property transferred subject to such a retained interest is
generally subject to inclusion under one or all of Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) sections 2036, 2037 and 2038.
Proponents of the new DAPT legislation claim that the legislation
presents new opportunities in the transfer tax planning arena."n However,

123. See, e.g., BORIS I. B1TTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 5 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,

ESTATES AND GIFrs, 120.2.2 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing tax advantages of lifetime gifting versus
testamentary transfers); CASNER & PENNELL, supra note 12, T[ 6.0 & 6.2 (discussing transfer tax
advantages of lifetime gifting versus testamentary transfers).
124. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 123, 1 120.2.2.
125. See BHTrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 123,
126; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 5,
f 4.08-.10.
126. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for the Restatement rule, and Part VII.E. 1,
infra, for a discussion of the impact of creditor access to trust property upon inclusion of such trust
property in the settlor's gross estate at death.
127. The domestic opinion presents "new" opportunities, notwithstanding the prior existence

of the offshore alternatives, for several reasons. Foremost among those are (i) the lower costs
associated with the creation of an APT domestically; (ii) the retention of assets in the more stable
and perceptibly more secure United States financial markets, and the trustee's domestic locale; and
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such analysis is most often either presumptive of (or at least overly
optimistic about) the asset protection effectiveness of the legislation, or
innocuously caveated with reference to the possible shortcomings of such
legislation from an asset protection standpoint. Such analysis commonly
includes only casual reference to the black-letter rules discernable from the
body of transfer tax law pertaining to tax-relevant retained interests, and
particularly creditors' rights with respect to property subject to such
retained interests." The purpose of the discussion which follows is to
more closely consider the implications of the new domestic asset
protection trust legislation, with an emphasis on specific transfer tax
planning considerations.
Posited in the discussion which follows is that, absent significant
precedent undermining the effectiveness of the DAPT legislation, no
applicable credit amount or similar gift in trust should be undertaken
without at least some consideration being given to utilizing one of the
DAPT statutes for creation of the trust. 29 While proceeding under the laws
of one of these DAPT jurisdictions will not always be the best choice, and
(iii) the absence of the "stigma!' associated with establishing an offshore arrangement associated
with the less reputable clientele making the new with respect to such arrangements. See, e.g.,
Henzy, supra note 2, at 740-41 (noting that domestic option may be approximately one-third the
cost of offshore alternative, with an aura of security accompanying the domestic option);
McMenamin, supranote 117, at 240 (relating stories ofoffshore trust settlors and their questionable
motivations); Baker, supra note 2, at 54 (relating story of husband perpetrating what amounts to
a fraud upon his wife via utilization of an offshore APT); see also text accompanying infra note
135. Of course, the opportunity for potential transfer tax advantages has been present for some time
with respect to offshore APT's. Marty-Nelson, supra note 5, at 415-27 (analyzing comparative
transfer tax advantages of OAPTs relative to domestic trusts). As recently as 1996, a then accurate
analysis of this area was aptly concluded as follows: "Given the pronounced trend awayfrom
protection of assets in domestic self-settled discretionary trusts and growing acceptance of the
Restatement's rule on this score, creating domestic self-settled discretionary trusts immune to estate
tax inclusion is an uphill struggle at best." Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., New Alaska, supranote 79, at 347 (discussing potential transfer tax planning
opportunities presented by new legislation). Particularly intriguing is the prospect of a transfer to
a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) or Grantor Retained Unitrust (GRUT), which, under
current thinking, provides the settlor with an income stream for a set number of years and a present
value discount on the gift tax value of the transferred remainder interest. Once the retained income
stream lapses, the settlor must relinquish all interests in the trust property to achieve the desired
exclusion of the trust remainder from the settlor's gross estate at death. The authors of the foregoing
article suggest that the settlor of a GRAT or GRUT created under one of the new DAPT statutes
could retain a discretionary interest in the trust assets, even after the mandatory income interest
terminates, and still achieve the desired exclusion of the trust remainder from the settlor's gross
estate at death. See id. at 354. In this current era of low interest rates, this scenario presents
attractive gift tax planning opportunities for the donor otherwise reluctant to set an absolute and
unconditional time limit on the settlor's potential receipt of income from the gifted property.
129. Indeed, some APT advocates have opined that, at least in the asset protection context,
failure to recommend an APT as a viable option could constitute malpractice. See, e.g.,
Marty-Nelson, supra note 11, at 73 (noting but by no means endorsing this view).

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VoL 52

in some cases would be a very bad choice for a given client, there are
nevertheless certain clients who could be well served by utilizing these
DAPT laws in their wealth transfer planning. However, questions about the
ability of the new laws to withstand a frontal assault by a persistent
creditor, coupled with existing precedent in both the bankruptcy and tax
areas, 30make proceeding under some of the promoted strategies quite
risky
Thus, while certainly worthy of consideration and discussion with
clients, it is unlikely that the new legislation will drastically change the
current estate and gift tax planning parameters for residents of states with
an established public policy against self-settled APT's, at least absent a
significant ruling upholding either the promised creditor protection for a
nonresident of the jurisdiction adopting the favorable DAPT legislation, or
more directly upholding the promoted estate tax benefits of a DAPT. It
must be emphasized that one of the purposes of the foregoing discussion
as to the possible weaknesses in DAPT legislation is that a settlor
contemplating a taxable gift to a DAPT must not go unadvised that, should
the creditor protection aspects of the DAPT fail, a gift tax will have been
paid (or exclusions and credits exhausted) without realization of benefit by
the ultimate trust beneficiaries to the extent trust property is recovered by
creditors.131 This risk alone may or may not outweigh the client's desire to
establish a DAPT with a retained right to discretionary distributions
therefrom, while simultaneously treating the arrangement as a completed
gift intended to remove property (and appreciation thereon) from the
settlor's gross estate at death. Weighing the desired transfer tax planning
outcome with the potential creditor exposure must ultimately be resolved
by the client after careful discussion with counsel of issues such as those
discussed in this article.
A. Client Situations
The question naturally arises as to what transfer tax clients might
benefit from the new DAPT legislation. Not every client contemplating a
significant gift or ongoing gifting plan will be benefitted by the new
legislation. For example, a wealthy client with little liability exposure
(attributable to other than life in a litigious society) and having few
apprehensions about irrevocably parting with, say $1,300,000 of property
through an applicable exclusion amount gift in trust, would have little need
to take advantage of the new DAPT legislation. After all, if the client has

130. See supra Part VI.
131. See Dam, supra note 79 (noting that the opportunity to do other planning could be lost
if reliance is placed on a domestic APT which ultimately fails to achieve the desired creditor or
transfer tax benefits).
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no qualms about the transfer and is exceedingly unlikely to ever care (apart
from future estate tax savings) that he or she has parted with the funds,
there is no need to risk estate taxation or liability exposure by having that
donor retain a discretionary interest in the trust to which such property
might be gifted-at least not in the current environment of uncertainty
surrounding the effectiveness of the new legislation. As an additional
example, a wealthy client desirous of reaping the transfer tax benefits of
currently gifting $1,300,000 of property through an applicable exclusion
amount gift but apprehensive about the transfer due to more than moderate
liability exposure, may be better advised to utilize an offshore trust in light
of the practical and constitutional arguments which weigh in favor of
offshore arrangements where asset protection is a primary motivation.
In contrast, there are numerous categories of clients interested in
lifetime gifting who might very well benefit from the new domestic
legislation. Such clients realize the potential benefits of lifetime gifting and
wish to avail themselves of some of those benefits, but are nevertheless
reluctant to part with any of their personal funds for fear of future
need-such fear arising notwithstanding the level of client wealth retained
and for reasons generally unrelated to the more specific types of creditor
concerns often prompting the creation of offshore APTs. This reluctance
is not an unknown phenomena, and the potential advantage132
to be taken of
the new domestic APT legislation has not gone unnoticed.
For example, a wealthy couple might wish to place significant assets
in trust for the ultimate (but not necessarily immediate) benefit of their
several children.133 Although the risks of adverse creditor claims against
the donor couple might currently seem low, such donors may nevertheless
be hesitant to take any action at all due to concern over their own future
needs. Such concern might arise, for example, by virtue of the intensely
competitive nature of a closely-held business which generated (and still
accounts for) a significant portion of the donor couple's wealth. The option
of gifting the property but retaining some connection thereto-even if the
connection is only in the form of a trustee's discretionary power-provides
an added element of flexibility and comfort to such donors in carrying out

132. See, e.g., CASNER & PENNEUL, supranote 12,16.2 (noting that a primary reason for not
making lifetime gifts is "fear that the remaining assets will be inadequate to support the donor for
the balance of the donor's life."); New Alaska, supra note 79, at 347 ("A major impediment to
individuals making lifetime gifts for estate planning is concern over losing all interest in the
property given away."); Shaftel, supranote 38, at56 ("Alaska self-settled discretionary spendthrift
trusts become a very attractive gift giving vehicle for a certain group of donors. These are donors
who would benefit from substantial annual exclusion and applicable credit gifts, but who also worry

that, in the future, they might need the assets given away.").
133. Indeed, such lifetime gifting plans are often recommended by estate planning practitioners
as a fundamental component of a wealth transfer tax planning strategy. See supra text
accompanying notes 124-31 (discussing lifetime versus testamentary transfers).
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their intended plans.1 3' Moreover, for many such donor couples, the option
of entrusting their funds to anyone outside the U.S. is either patently
unappealing or otherwise viewed as overly complicating the gifting plan,
and the odds of such an approach being adopted by many such couples
requirements
would perhaps be nil in light of the foreign trust reporting
13
and other psychological impediments to going offshore.
Although there are certainly unanswered questions about the new
domestic APT legislation, the discussion below should make clear that the
practitioner discussing transfer tax planning options with clients should, at
minimum, advise many such clients as to the possibility of utilizing a
domestic trust in-which the client can retain a discretionary right to income
and/or principal. The discussion set forth herein is informative, not only as
to the availability and plausibility of such a plan and the types of
considerations to be taken into account should such a plan be adopted, but
also with regard to the types of disclosures that would absolutely be
required to permit the client to fully appreciate the risks and unknowns in
so proceeding. In considering the discussion of transfer tax laws which
follows, the potential benefits and risks of a DAPT-as discussed
previously in Part VI of this article, should be kept in mind.
B. Estate and Gift Tax Overlap
There are both gift and estate tax implications where a settlor transfers
property to a trust of which the settlor also is a beneficiary. The original
transfer to the trust may be structured as a completed gift subject to
immediate gift taxation, or the gift may, for transfer tax purposes, be
structured as incomplete such that no gift taxes are due at the time of
transfer.136 Whether the gift is complete or incomplete often turns upon the
extent to which the settlor retains the power to alter the beneficiaries'
enjoyment of the transferred property.137 Such a power might exist, for
example, if the settlor creates a discretionary trust but retains a
testamentary power to appoint trust assets among the beneficiaries in a
proportion different from that otherwise specified in the trust
instrument-in which case the gift will be deemed incomplete and no gift

134. Indeed, such a gift of closely-held business stock to a domestic APT could ultimately
facilitate a sale of the closely-held business entity, since the settlor-patriarch may feel less
compelled to retain a salaried interest in the entity than might be the case had a significant stock
interest been given away absolutely.
135. See Dam, supra note 79 ("While the Alaska law doesn't offer as much protection as
foreign trusts, it eliminates some of the dangers, complications and costs and may be attractive to
many people who don't want to move their assets overseas.").
136. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1983) (discussing complete versus
incomplete gifts).
137. See id.
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taxes will be imposed upon the settlor's transfer of property to the trust.1 38
Similarly, if under applicable state law the transferred property remains
subject to the claims of the settlor's creditors following the transfer to the
trust, the gift will not be deemed complete for transfer tax purposes, since
the settlor can affect the other trust beneficiaries' enjoyment of the trust39
property by incurring debts to which the trust property may be subjected. 1
In contrast, a gift to a self-settled trust will be deemed complete, and
thus taxable where, "under applicable state law the trustee's decision as to
whether to distribute trust assets to the grantor is entirely voluntary [and]
[t]he grantor cannot require that any of the trust's assets be distributed to
the grantor nor can the creditors of the grantor reach any of the trust's
assets.... ."140 Moreover, property transferred by lifetime gift may be
includible in the donor's taxable estate at death if a prohibited interest in
or power over the transferred property is retained by the
donor-notwithstanding that 1a41gift tax may have been imposed on the
transfer at the time of the gift.
Because of this overlap between the estate and gift tax regimes, many
of the cases discussed below are exclusively estate or gift tax cases but turn
upon the same basic issue. That issue involves the extent of the settlor's
retained ability to affect the disposition or enjoyment of trust assets, which,
in the self-settled trust context, is often implicated by the extent to which
state law permits the settlor-beneficiary to subject trust assets to the claims
of the settlor's creditors. Also relevant in the context of a self-settled trust
is whether there exists an implied agreement between the settlor and the
trustee as to the continued enjoyment of the trust property by the settlor,
such as through an understanding that the settlor will receive all of the trust
income notwithstanding a trust instrument which expressly provides for
trustee discretion over such matters. In the gift tax context such issues
affect whether or not a gift is complete, and therefore taxable at the time
of transfer, and in the estate tax context such issues affect the extent to
which the settlor has failed to fully relinquish all rights in or powers over
the transferred property such that all or some portion thereof will be

138.
139.
140.
property,

See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 347; see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) ("As to any
or part thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has so parted with dominion and

control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another, the gift is complete. But if upon the transfer of property... the donor reserves
any power over its disposition, the gift may be wholly ...or partially incomplete....").
141. See STEPHENS ETAL., supra note 5, 9 10.10(10) ("As a basic principle, it can be stated

that a transfer treated as complete for gift tax purposes is not necessarily similarly treated for
purposes of either the income tax or the estate tax."); BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 123,
126.3.6 & 132.3 (discussing unified estate and gift tax system and gross estate inclusion of property
previously transferred by completed taxable gift).
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taxable in the settlor's estate at death.
This estate and gift tax overlap implicates one of the policy concerns of
the IRS in evaluating the challenges which have been raised and which
may be raised against self-settled trust transactions. Case law and informal
conversations with IRS personnel reveal the problem of a settlorbeneficiary claiming a nontaxable incomplete gift upon funding a trust, by
virtue of one of the proscribed retained interests discussed below-and
then at the settlor's subsequent death, his or her estate failing to report the
trust assets as includible in the settlor's estate on the theory that the interest
retained was insufficient to result in estate inclusion. 42 The following
discussion of the potential use of DAPTs in wealth transfer planning is
focused upon the circumstance of a wealthy client desiring to make a
completed taxable gift of property which will not be brought back into the
settlor's gross estate at death.
C. Statutory Background
Although there is considerable overlap among the various statutory
provisions which are most likely to result in federal estate taxation of
property transferred to a self-settled DAPT,' 43 Internal Revenue Code
sections 2036(a)(1) and 2038(a) are most often the point of dispute in
retained interest transfer tax cases, and in particular those cases where
retention is claimed by virtue of creditors' rights to reach the settlor's
interest in trust property or by virtue of an implied agreement as to the
settlor's continued enjoyment of trust property.'"
142. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 801-02 & n.8 (1986) ('The
Commissioner] has accompanied his arguments with repeated expressions of concern about the
potential abuses of the family trust concept in the estate and gift tax fields."); CASNER & PENNELL,
supra note 12, 6.02 (discussing a potential whipsaw). The concern expressed in Paxton
apparently arises out oftheinconsistent arguments that taxpayers sometimes assert, depending upon
whether the tax controversy concerns a gift tax issue--e.g., the taxpayer argues that the transfers
were incomplete, or that the donor received something of equal value in return, thus avoiding gift
taxation-or an estate tax issue-e.g., the taxpayer argues that the transfers were complete when
made and no taxable interests were retained, or that what the donor received as consideration for
transfer and still retained at death really had no value, thus avoiding estate taxation.
143. See Dodge,supranote 5, at 270-71 (discussing common legislative origin ofIRC sections
2036-2038 and the considerable, and often confusing, overlap between those provisions).
144. The right of the settlor's creditors to reach trust property has sometimes been described
as a settlor-retained interest in the transferred property under IRC section 2036(a)(1), and
sometimes as a power of revocation under IRC section 2038. CompareRev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1
C.B. 293 (creditors' rights akin to settlor's powerto terminate trust), with Estateof Paxton,86 T.C.
at 814 ("Retention of the right to use the trust as a form of security for his indebtedness [by virtue
of creditors' rights to trust property] left [the settlor] with a significant interest in the property...
that is sufficient to require [the settloer's] transfers to the trusts to be included in his gross estate
under section 2036(a)(1).").
Other estate and gift tax provisions of primary relevance to the advisor contemplating the
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implications of the new domestic legislation on a major wealth transfer plan include Internal
Revenue Code:
Section 2037, which brings into the settlor's gross estate property which can
only be enjoyed by other beneficiaries if they survive the settlor, and as to
which property the settlor has retained a reversionary interest which exceeds
in value (at the time of the settloer's death) 5% of the value of the transferred
property. See I.R.C. § 2037 (1996). However, since it is unlikely that a DAPT
would be drafted such that inclusion would result under IRC § 2037 alone,
this section will not be discussed in detail. See Dodge, supranote 5, at 267-78
(discussing situations to which IRC sections 2036 and/or 2037 apply). For a
case in which estate inclusion was sought but denied underIRC sections 2035,
2036,2037 and 2038, see Clarkv. UnitedStates, 209 F. Supp. 895 (D. Colo.
1962).

Section 2033, which will bring into the settloer's gross estate any property
which the trustee decides to distribute to the settlor-beneficiary of the trust and
which the settlor does not thereafter expend or otherwise dispose of prior to
death. See I.R.C. § 2033 (1996). IRC section 2033 provides: "The valueof the
gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death." Id.; see also Dodge, supra
note 5, at 271 ('The income or corpus actually received will augment the
transferor's section 2033 gross estate."). With regard to the interrelationship
of IRC section 2033 and the IRC section 2036(a)(1) principles discussed see
STEPHENS ET AI., supranote 5, 4.08, where the authors note that
as far as... section [2033] is concerned, an individual could gratuitously
transfer property in trust, ridding himself of legal title, and yet retain the
right to income from the property for life without having his estate suffer
an estate tax liability with respect to the property upon his death. This, of
course, would be a real cake-and-eat-it scheme; but it is frustrated by
section 2036(a)(1). In general, this section [2036(a)(1)] includes in the
gross estate the entire value of property so transferred by the decedent....
Section 2035, which brings into the settlor's gross estate property interests
transferred and property over which the settlor relinquished a power, within
three years of death, which interest or power otherwise would have resulted
in the inclusion of such property in the settloer's gross estate under IRC
sections 2036-2038, if such interest or power had been retained by the settlor
until death. See I.R.C. § 2035(a)(1) & (2) (1996) (applying to decedents dying
after August 5, 1997). Planners should take note of this provision when
contemplating a self-settled DAPT, because if the case law should develop
unfavorably after a self-settled DAPT is funded, this three year rule could
become relevant should the settlor then relinquish any interest in the trust.
This discussion omits reference to some of the more obvious estate inclusion problems, some of
which would also serve to defeat the asset protective benefits of the new domestic legislation. For
example, if the settlor were to retain a right to receive mandatory income distributions from a selfsettled trust, at least a portion of the trust property would clearly be includible in the settloer's gross
estateunderIRC section 2036(a)(1), and the assetprotection benefits afforded underthe Alaskaand
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1. Section 2036(a)(1)
Section 2036(a)(1) of the IRC will bring into the settlor's gross estate
transferred property if the settlor retains "the possession or enjoyment of,
or right to the income from, the property... ."'5 In the context of a DAPT
of which the settlor is a beneficiary, inclusion is most likely to result
through either (i) the settlor's retained enjoyment of the property by virtue
of an implied agreement between the settlor and the trustee to that effect;
or (ii) the settlor' s retained interest in the trust property, which interest may
be deemed to exist solely by virtue of the settlor' s ability to use the trust as
a form of security for the settlor's indebtedness, where under state law the
settlor's creditors can reach
trust property in satisfaction of the settlor46
obligations.
beneficiary's
The purpose behind IRC section 2036(a)(1) is to bring into a decedent's
gross estate property transferred during life but in a manner akin to a
testamentary transfer by virtue of the interests which the decedent retained
in the property until the time of death."4 "The philosophy underlying these
[2036(a)] rules is not troublesome; if the transferor retains in himself
essentially full lifetime benefits from transferred property, the ultimate
shifting of enjoyment at [the transferor's] death is sufficiently akin to
testamentary disposition
of property to justify the imposition of estate tax
148
time.
that
at
2. Section 2038
Similarly settled principles under IRC section 2038 require property to
be included in the settlor's gross estate where the settlor has retained a
power "to alter, amend, revoke or terminate" any other person's beneficial
enjoyment of the property.'4 9 While there is considerable overlap with the
IRC section 2036(a)(1) principles noted above, 150 the general theory of IRC

Delaware statutes would be lost to the extent of the mandatory right. In addition, although both the
Alaska and Delaware legislation allow a settlor to retain a right to veto distributions from a trust
without jeopardizing the asset protection benefits to the settlor-beneficiary, such a retained veto
power would also result in the inclusion in the settlor's estate of the property subject to the power,
under IRC section 2036(a)(2) and/or section 2038. For a discussion of the overlap between IRC
sections 2036 and 2038 on this latter point, see BrFrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 123, 126.6.7.
145. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1996).
146. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C. at 808 (holding IRC section 2036(a)(1) estate
inclusion appropriate under both theories).
147. See Estate ofWhitt v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 1548, 1558 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 1005 (1985).
148. STEPHENS E" AL, supra note 5, 1 4.08(4)(a)
149. I.R.C. § 2038 (1996).

150. See, e.g., Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 153, 168 n.5 (1981) (noting that creditors'
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section 2038(a)(1) inclusion with respect to a self-settled trust is that the
settlor is deemed to have retained the power to terminate the trust by
incurring debt and thereby relegating the settlor's creditors to the trust
property for satisfaction of their claims.151 Of course, this would only be
the case if applicable state law provided creditors with the right to pursue
the trust property by virtue of the settlor's retained rights in the trust
property.
That these policies and principles represent the law relevant to property
held in a self-settled trust is not an issue of contention.152 What is open to
debate, however, is the manner in which these principles will impact a
wealth transfer plan which includes a self-settled DAPT created under one
of the new domestic statutes. As will be seen below, it is not merely the
retention of a right to receive distributions in the absolute discretion of a
third-party trustee which implicates these policies and principles. Rather,
something more is required, such as the state law rights of creditors to
reach the property subject to the discretionary power, or an implied
agreement as to how that discretion will be exercised.
D. IRS Rulings
The IRS is clear (and correct) in its position that the assets of a selfsettled trust will be includible in the settlor's gross estate to the extent the
settlor retains an interest in those assets.'53 More specifically, the rights of
the settlor's creditors to reach trust property will result in a gift transfer to
the trust being deemed incomplete and therefore not taxable, 5 4 and will
also lead to inclusion of the trust property in the settlor's estate to the
extent of the interest reachable by such creditors as of the date of the
settlor's death."5
In this regard, although federal law determines the transfer tax
consequences of such rights, the extent of such rights are determined under
applicable state law. 5 6 A review of the relevant rulings seems to reveal a
tendency on the part of the IRS to base its estate and gift tax conclusions
upon the stated law of the jurisdiction to which a self-settled trust is

rights to reach trust property may result in estate inclusion under IRC section 2036(a)(1) or IRC
section 2038(a)(1)). This overlap is discussed in STEPHENS ET AL, supra note 5, 1 4.10(1).
151. See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
152. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C. 785, 808 (1986); Estate of German v. United States,
7 Cl. Ct. 641, 642 (1985); Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049, 1061-63 (1975)
(acknowledging and applying these principles).
153. See Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 347.
154. See id.; Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
155. See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
156. See Estate ofMcNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667,670 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361

U.S. 829 (1959).
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facially subject. For example, in Revenue Ruling 76-103, after concluding
that a gift in trust was not complete and would be subject to estate
inclusion under IRC section 2038, the IRS noted:
As long as the trustee continues to administer the trust under
the law of State X [which permits creditors to reach trust
property], the grantor retains dominion and control over the
trust property.... If and when the grantor's dominion and
control.., ceases, such as by the trustee's decision to move
the situs of the trust to a State where the grantor's creditors
cannot reach the trust assets, then the gift is complete.... 157
There is little indication in the IRS rulings that any detailed consideration
would be given to potential arguments that a hypothetical creditor might
assert in attempting to defeat the creditor protection purportedly offered
under the laws ofthejurisdiction selected by the settlor or trustee to govern
the trust. 5 However, reliance on this silence as indicative of the transfer
tax results applicable to a nonresident of a DAPT jurisdiction funding a
self-settled trust may be presumptuous, absent a more specific revenue
ruling involving transfer tax results under the new DAPT legislation when
utilized by a settlor who is not a resident of the DAPT jurisdiction.
However, there is no indication that the IRS might take a more
restrictive view than that espoused in Revenue Ruling 76-103, if
confronted with a situation involving the new DAPT legislation and a nonDAPT jurisdiction resident settlor. In fact, the IRS has issued favorable
Private Letter Rulings under both the new Alaska statute and the laws of
an offshore jurisdiction, although such rulings should, at best, be viewed
as insightful since they do not establish legal precedent upon which other
taxpayer's might rely.'59 In both rulings, the IRS seemed to look solely to
the rights of creditors under the law of the jurisdiction in which the assets
would be administered and which was recited in the trust instrument as

157. Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
158. The IRS has, at least on one occasion, given mention to an issue which might be raised
where a non-DAPT state resident creates a trust to be administered under the laws of a DAPT,
although the insight to be gained from this nonprecedential private letter ruling is limited, at best.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8829030 (Apr. 20, 1988). The IRS cited precedent from the law of the settlor's
domicile which indicated that the law of the state in which the trust was administered would be
applied in resolving legal issues concerning the trust. See id. On this basis the IRS applied the law
of the state of trust administration to conclude that the settlor's creditors could not reach the
settlor's interest in the trust, and thus that there would be no estate inclusion under IRC section
2038. See id. There was no discussion of any public policy or other reason to question that the law

of the state of administration would govern.
159. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (June 10, 1998) (Alaska statute); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9332006
(Aug. 20, 1992) (offshore self-settled trust). As to the precedential status of such rulings, see I.R.C.
§ 6110G)(3).
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governing the trust. 16 In the offshore context, the IRS ruled both that the
transfer to the trust would be deemed a completed gift and the trust
property would not be subject to inclusion in the settlor-beneficiary's gross
estate under IRC section 2033 or IRC sections 2036-2038.161 In contrast,
in the more recent private letter ruling concerning an Alaska DAPT, the
IRS expressly declined to rule on the estate inclusion issue.1 62 Informal
conversations with the author of the Alaska private letter ruling indicate
that the discrepancy in results (or the IRS's willingness to rule) is not the
result of anything specific about the laws of thejurisdiction at issue or any
understanding at the IRS that OAPT assets may be less accessible to
creditors. Instead, the more recent refusal to rule on the Alaska issue may
best be construed as a tightening of IRS policy in this area since the date
the offshore trust ruling was authored. The IRS's primary (albeit
informally) stated concern in not ruling on the estate tax issue in the
Alaska DAPT scenario was the possibility that an express or implied
agreement may exist between the settlor and the trustee as to the settlor's
retained interest in the trust, and that such an agreement would only be
revealed by subsequently developed facts relating 1to63 the ongoing
administration of the DAPT and distributions therefrom.
Perhaps the most that can be said about the IRS rulings in this area is
that they evidence the two most prevalent concerns about a transfer tax
challenge based upon assets held in a self-settled DAPT-specifically,
retained interest arguments based upon either the rights of the settlor's
creditors to reach trust property, or the existence of an implied agreement
concerning the settlor's continued enjoyment of trust property. That the

160. However, it should be noted that the Alaska ruling involved an Alaska resident, and thus
the potential challenges to the applicability of Alaska law seem less significant, and therefore more
easily ignored, than had the settlor been a non-Alaska resident. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (June
10, 1998).
161. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9332006 (Aug. 20, 1992).
162. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (June 10, 1998).

163. See id. The IRS has apparently stated this rationale similarly to others. See, e.g.,
Roundtable Discussion, supra note 33, at 816 (Gideon Rothschild commenting upon his

conversations with IRS author of the Alaska ruling). See Shaftel, supra note 38, at 57 (noting that
counsel representing the Alaska donor indicated the IRS's belief that the estate issue was merely
hypothetical at the time of the ruling, and, alternatively, that the IRS simply would not rule for
policy reasons; Shaftel believes that a simpler explanation for the refusal was the implied agreement

issue). The IRS author of the Alaska ruling has expressly stated to this author that the implied
agreement possibility justified the IRS refusal to rule privately on the estate inclusion issue in the
self-settled trust context-a possibility which need not be explored where inclusion is obviously
dictated by virtue of creditors' rights in the trust property. Compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8829030 (Apr.
20, 1988) (refusing to rule under IRC section 2036 due to potential for implied agreement), with
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9646021 (Aug. 16, 1996) (stating the IRC section 2036 inclusion is based on

creditors' rights in trust property under governing state law). For a discussion of this implied
agreement issue, see Part VII.E.2., supra.
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IRS will simply accept the choice of law stated in the trust instrument in
the case of a nonresident of one of the DAPT jurisdictions is perhaps a
reasonable conclusion to draw, but reliance on such a conclusion in a
formal planning situation would seem risky at best, particularly if the
planning arrangement is otherwise aggressive so as to merit significant IRS
scrutiny. For example, if a self-settled DAPT were funded with entity
interests upon which significant valuation discounts were taken for
purposes of gift tax reporting, the IRS might be inclined to be aggressive
in pursuing estate tax inclusion of trust assets if the valuation issue were
first noticed in the context of an estate tax audit. This might be particularly
true if the applicable statute of limitations for revaluing gifts had expired,
such that the IRS lacked the ability to challenge the gifting transaction on
the basis of excessive valuation discounts taken.1"
E. Transfer Tax Case Law
There is adequate case law addressing the issue of a settlor's retained
interest arising by virtue of creditors' rights and/or implied agreements as
to the use of trust property for the settlor-beneficiary's benefit.1 65 Such
judicial opinions are revealing as to factors which an advisor should note
in crafting a self-settled DAPT under the new domestic legislation,
particularly vith regard to the implied agreement issue. As to creditors'
rights, the general principle of estate inclusion is not in dispute where such
rights are clearly ascertainable. Thus, for example, where an Alaska
resident-settlor establishes an Alaska spendthrift trust for the settlor' s own
benefit, there will likely be little issue as to creditors' rights under
applicable state law, and thus there should be little likelihood of an estate
inclusion dispute on this basis."6 However, nonresident settlors seeking to
take advantage of the self-settled spendthrift trust provisions of a domestic
APT jurisdiction arguably face less certainty in this regard. 167
164. For the applicable statute of limitations for revaluing gifts, see I.R.C. §§ 6501(c)(9),
2504(c) (1996).
165. See infra notes 174-224 and accompanying text.
166. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (June 10, 1998). This is not to say, however, that if such a
settlor were to incur adebt outside of the settlor's home state in a non-DAPTjurisdiction, acreditor
would in all events be precluded from obtaining a judgment against the settlor-debtor in the
jurisdiction in which the debt was incurred, and that such ajudgment might purport to invalidate
the trust transfers on the basis of the forum state's public policy, thus again raising the full faith and
credit and jurisdictional issues discussed above. See supra Part V.B.2-3. It would seem, however,
that the possibility of the results of a transfer tax case turning upon such a hypothetical scenario
would be less for a resident settlor than in the case of a nonresident settlor. "Nonresident" as used
here and in the text, supra, is intended to refer to a settlor who is not a resident of a state the DAPT
laws of which the settlor seeks to take advantage.
167. Seethe discussion pertaining to the effectiveness of domestic APT legislation in Part VI,
supra, and in particular the discussion concerning the potential complications arising when such
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Unlike the Bankruptcy courts, 68 courts in tax disputes have not
explored issues such as the validity of the settlor's choice of law provision
or the possibility that the law of some other jurisdiction should apply such
that creditors' rights would be broader than under the governing law stated
in the instrument. 169 However, transfer tax cases have arisen in which the
resolution of transfer tax issues turned upon state law creditors' rights
which were not clearly defined in the self-settled trust context. 7 ° The
courts' willingness in such cases to find for or against creditor rights-with
the attendant transfer tax consequences-could be viewed as indicative of
the courts' willingness to explore such issues in the more troublesome
context of a transfer tax dispute involving a DAPT. Resolution of such
issues in the context of a DAPT is likely to be more complex, however,
since a result favorable to the IRS may turn upon the court's acceptance of
the IRS's possible assertion that the DAPT jurisdiction's laws, stated as
governing in the trust instrument, should be disregarded or are otherwise
ineffective-such that the IRS prevails on a creditors' rights/settlor
retained interest theory of estate inclusion. For example, such an assertion
might be based upon the public policy of the state of the settlorbeneficiary's domicile at death if other than a DAPT jurisdiction, or the
IRS could cite language in the governing DAPT statute which 17
permits
certain limited classes of creditors to recover against trust assets. 1
Unfortunately, the results in the transfer tax cases to date are mixed
with regard to indicating the likely level of scrutiny the courts might give
to the various arguments which the IRS could proffer on behalf of a
hypothetical creditor where estate tax inclusion of DAPT assets is at
issue. 172 The tax court is seemingly more willing than other federal courts
to find the existence of a retained interest in cases where the rights of

weaknesses are called into question in a transfer tax dispute involving a hypothetical creditor.
168. See, e.g., Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)
(holding that spendthrift provisions set forth in Jersey (Channel Islands) and Bermuda trusts funded
with property transferred by a U.S. debtor-beneficiary, were unenforceable under Connecticut law,
which the court found to be applicable notwithstanding contrary choice of law provisions in the
governing instruments); Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 702
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (similar result and reasoning).
169. The question of applicable state law has certainly been addressed in tax court decisions
(and obviously in those controversies considered by federal courts), although not in a context which
would indicate any litigated dispute over this issue. See, e.g, Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86
T.C. 785, 787 (1986) (noting simply that the "principal office of each of the[] trusts and the legal
residence of each of the... trustees... were in the State of Washington....").
170. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Commissioner (In re Estate of Uhl), 241 F.2d 867 (7th
Cir. 1957); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) discussed in text accompanying
infra notes 173-79.
171. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing a provision in the Delaware

legislation).
172. See Part VII.E.I., supra.
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creditors are not altogether clear under state law. Such mixed results call
into question the level of comfort available to a non- DAPT jurisdiction
resident-settlor seeking transfer tax advantages under the laws of a DAPT
jurisdiction, since by the IRS might similarly cloud the issue of creditors'
rights by proffering various arguments as to the effectiveness of the DAPT
legislation. Such arguments could, in turn, provide a court with sufficient
leeway to reach an estate tax inclusion result which the court otherwise
deems appropriate in light of the several factors which might influence the
court's perception of the dispute.
However, there are specific actions which a settlor and the settlor's
advisors might take to maximize the nexus between the DAPT jurisdiction
and the trust, and otherwise to increase the likelihood that the desired
transfer tax advantages would be upheld were the arrangement subjected
to IRS challenge. In considering such actions, advisors must be mindful of
the two most likely bases upon which the potential transfer tax advantages
offered by a DAPT might be defeated-specifically, retained interest
arguments based upon either the rights of the settlor's creditors to reach
trust property, or the existence of an implied agreement concerning the
settlor's continued enjoyment of trust property. Such matters, as well as the
particular planner's acceptance of the various arguments posited above
both for and against the effectiveness of the DAPT legislation, are likely
to influence the planner's approach in advising clients as to the use of a
DAPT for transfer tax planning reasons.
1. Creditors' Rights
An example of the courts' approach to a transfer tax challenge based
upon retained interests via creditors' rights is the Seventh Circuit decision
in NationalCity Bank v. Commissioner(In re Estate of Uhl)'73 wherein the
court found that state law did not clearly implicate the rights of creditors
to reach trust property, and, thus, that estate inclusion by virtue of such
creditors' alleged access to trust property was improper. 74 Although the
Seventh Circuit and the tax court agreed upon the governing federal tax
law principles of estate inclusion based on creditors' rights, the Seventh
Circuit decision that creditors could not reach the trust assets under state
law was a reversal of the tax court's holding, which was described by the
Seventh Circuit as "based... upon the theory that the settlor's creditors,
by properlitigation,might have reachedall ofthe corpus.., and that such
a possibility constituted retention" by the settlor sufficient to result in
estate inclusion. 175,

173. 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
174. See id. at 870.
175. Id. (emphasis added). While the Seventh Circuit's willingness to find against the
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Similarly, in one of the earlier and most often cited cases in this transfer
tax area, the Second Circuit in Herzog v. Commissioner76 found a
completed gift where creditors' rights under applicable state law were "in
doubt" due to a lack of applicable precedent in the precise context of a selfsettled trust. 177 The court opined that estate inclusion would not be
appropriate. 17 In so concluding, the court noted the widely accepted
Restatement principles in favor of creditor access to the trust property, but
went out of its way to find the Restatement rule unpersuasive as to the
real
hypothetical creditor's rights in the case at hand, citing the more
179
presence of remainder beneficiaries under the trust as significant.
Although of less precedential value, the onus on the IRS to show that
creditors could recover against the assets of a self-settled trust where state
law is unclear is typified by the claims court case of Estate of German v.
United States."s Like the courts in Herzog and Estate of Uhl, the claims
court was willing to distinguish existing state law precedent, not directly
on point as to self-settled trusts, to find that the IRS had failed to establish
that the settlor's creditors could access the trust property.'
hypothetical creditor is the interesting point to note about the approach taken in Estateof Uhl, there
is some cause to question the Seventh Circuit's understanding of the consequences of its finding
with regard to state law. The court incorrectly states that "such a right [in creditors to reach trust
property], if it existed, was the right of the creditors, not that of the grantor." Id. The idea that such
creditors' rights implicate rights in the decedent was more properly stated by the tax court in Estate
of Paxton, where the court noted that
[w]here the decedent at any time during his life could have obtained the economic
benefit of the trust [property] by borrowing and then forcing his creditors to look
to [his] interest in the trust [property] for a source of repayment, this interest has
been held sufficient to require the inclusion of the transferred property in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1).
Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 815 (1986).
176. 116 F.2d 591 (2dCir. 1941).
177. Id. Interestingly, the courts of the state of New York (the laws of which were at issue in
Herzog) later resolved this issue definitively in favor of creditors. See Estate ofPaxton, 86 T.C. at
816 n.29 (discussing evolution of New York law on this point).
178. See Herzog, 116 F.2d at 595. This portion of the opinion with regard to estate tax
consequences is arguably dicta, although the analysis and the court's approach to theunsettled issue
of state law is not thereby lessened, since the estate and gift tax consequences turned on the same
issue.
179. See id. at 594. The court believed the Restatement rule to be based in large part on
decisions where the settlor beneficiary was the sole beneficiary, in contrast to the circumstance
before the court in which there were other beneficiaries of the trust. See id. But see Estate of Uhl
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 22,25 (1955) (distinguishing Herzog based upon the lack of other trust
beneficiaries in the case at hand), rev'd, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957). For the applicable
Restatement rule, see 1RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 156 (1959).
180. 7 Cl. Ct. 641, 644-45 (1985).
181. See id. ("[Tihe trusts here, but not in [the applicable state law case addressing creditor's
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In contrast, the tax court in EstateofPaxton182 took an approach which
clearly cuts against any assumption that the absence of clear state law
precedent on the creditors' rights issue would lead a court to find against
the hypothetical creditor, and therefore in favor of a taxpayer seeking to
exclude self-settled trust assets from the settlor's gross estate. 83 In Estate
of Paxton, the rights of creditors-and the resulting estate inclusion or
exclusion-under the law of Washington state were at issue." 4 Having
already found estate inclusion proper under an implied agreement in this
clearly abusive situation, 8 ' the tax court went on to consider whether estate
inclusion was proper by virtue of the rights of creditors to reach trust
property under state law. 86 Two Washington statutes discussed by the
court seemed to clearly permit creditors to reach trust property. 187 Thecourt
nevertheless entertained the taxpayer's argument that the statutory
provisions did not apply to the case at hand due to a lack of intent to
defraud, and under that line of reasoning the court looked to Washington
common law to discern the rights of creditors."'8 In what is arguably a
direct contrast to the approach taken by the courts in such cases as Estate
of Uhl, Herzog, and Estate of German, the court in Estate of Paxton
concluded: "[w]e have found no cases... and petitioners [taxpayers] have
cited none... suggesting that the courts of Washington would not follow
the almost universally accepted rule of Restatement, Trusts 2d, see. 156(2)
... [that] decedent's creditors could reach the maximum amount which...
could be distributed to him [from the trusts].... ,,."9
rights in the context of a deed of trust of which grantor was beneficiary] made dispositions of the
property upon the death of the settlor and were not intended solely to shield her assets from her
creditors.").
182. See 86 T.C. 785 (1986).
183. See id. at 820.

184. See id. at 801.
185. See infraPart VII.E.2., regarding estate inclusion under lRC section 2036(a)(1) by virtue

of an implied agreement as to the settlor's continued enjoyment of trust property notwithstanding
transfer of such property to a trust. The situation in Paxtonseemed clearly abusive in that the settlor
established and funded trusts, receiving in exchange for property contributed to the trusts
"Certificates of Interest" representing his interests under the trusts. See 86 T.C. at 802 n.8. The
taxpayer disputed a prior gift tax deficiency with respect to the transfers of property to the trusts
(which trusts had other beneficiaries) by asserting that the taxpayer received something of equal
value (the Certificates) in exchange for the property transferred to the trusts. See id. at 809. Yet, in
the subsequent estate tax dispute, the taxpayer asserted that the trust interests should not be
included in his estate because they had no discernable value in light of the discretion vested in the
trustee. See id. at 802 n.8, 805, 809.
186. See id. at 818.
187. See id. at 816-18 (concluding that "[t]wo Washington statutes address this issue" and that

under state law there was thus "an implicit recognition of the [Restatement] principle...
188. See id.

189. Id. at 818-19 (footnote omitted). As noted above, the court did find that Washington
courts would likely follow the Restatement principles, as those principles were strongly implicated
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A nonresident settlor having created a trust under the laws of a DAPT
jurisdiction, but as to whom the laws of the settlor's domicile are more
clearly implicated in creditor relations, might find a court similarly willing
to resolve some of the questions concerning the effectiveness of a selfsettled DAPT by reference to the Restatement rule and the public policy of
the settlor's state of domicile. This is not to say that such an approach
would be sound or even clear as to its implications concerning the actual
practical access by creditors to the property held under a DAPT, but rather,
that such an approach cannot be ruled out and would find some support in
sources such as those relied upon by the tax court in Estate of Paxton.'90
On the other hand, the tax court case of Outwin v. Commissioner"'
could also be viewed as demonstrative of a court's reluctance to speculate
as to the rights of creditors for transfer tax purposes. In Outwin, however,
it was the IRS requesting the court to find that a right in a remainder
beneficiary to veto distributions to the settlor would defeat creditor claims
under applicable state law, thus rendering the transfers to the self-settled

by the two Washington statutes addressed by the court. See id. at 816-18. The cited Restatement
section provides: "Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary
trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms
of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit." 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 156(2) (1959).
190. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 63, cmt.b (1959) (ifa person creates a selfsettled trust "and the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust was to prevent his creditors, present
or future, from reaching the property, the intended trust is invalid."); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 15, § 211 ("If a trust.., has a purpose contrary to public policy... the courts will not permit
the illegal objective of the settlor to be accomplished and will declare the trust void... or in the
case of [specific violative] clauses, will strike [such clauses] and enforce the trust without regard
[to such clauses]."); VA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 96, § 598 ('There are situations in which
the designation by the settlor of the governing law may be ineffective, even though he designates
a state having a substantial connection with the trust [via, e.g., the trustee's domicile or the situs
of trust assets]. On a particular issue of validity the ground for invalidity may rest upon such a
strong policy of a state whose law would otherwise govern that the settlor would not be permitted
to avoid the policy merely by designating another state as that of the controlling law."); supra note
85 and accompanying text. But see id. § 573 (containing the authors' further comment that: "In
Hanson v. Denckla [discussed herein at note 88] the issue was as to the validity of the disposition
of trust property. A similar question may arise as to the effect of a judgment rendered by a court
[not having] primary jurisdiction [over the administration of the trust], giving instructions to the
trustee as to his powers and duties or authorizing or directing the trustee to deviate from the terms
of the trust. These matters are certainly ordinarily for the determination by the court that has
primary supervision over the administration of the trust. Certainly in most cases the courts of...
states (not having primary jurisdiction over administration of the trust] would decline to exercise
jurisdiction ....
If, however, such a court does exercise jurisdiction, the Supreme Court might well
hold that the court of primary supervision is not bound to give full faith and credit to the judgment.
Indeed, it might hold the judgment to be invalid even in the state that rendered it on the ground that
it is an undue interference with the administration of the trust and a denial of due process of law.").
191. 76 T.C. 153 (1981).

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VoL 52

trusts completed gifts.192 In finding that creditors' rights were sufficient to
render the gift incomplete notwithstanding the veto power, the court cited
the strong public policy underlying the applicable state law against selfsettled spendthrift trusts, which policy-based creditors' rights the court felt
would not be defeated by the simple expedient of placing a veto power
over distributions in the hands of a beneficiary with a potentially adverse
interest.193

This approach could be seen as a willingness on the part of courts to
examine the rights of a hypothetical creditor in detail for transfer tax
purposes, but the better interpretation-at least of the cited cases-seems
to be that, in general, some clear authority establishing the rights of
creditors will be required before the transfer tax result of estate inclusion
will be found."9 Proponents of the planning opportunities presented by the
DAPT statutes might argue more strongly that the cited cases show that
where creditors' rights under the state law facially governing
administration of the trust is clear, courts confronted with transfer tax
issues will not speculate as to circumstances which might alter the state
law result-and similarly, that where state law is unclear as to the rights of
creditors, the courts will tend to find against creditor access to trust
property.
Of course, in the transfer tax context of a DAPT, it is not state law, per
se, as to creditors' rights that will likely be unclear (since the well-advised
settlor will have stated in the instrument that the governing law is that of
a DAPT jurisdiction), but rather, the key issue may be the validity of the
settlor's choice of law provision as set forth in the trust instrument. If the
settlor provides in the trust instrument that (for example) Alaska law
governs, but such settlor resides in a non-DAPT state with a clear public
policy against such creditor protection, a creditor action brought in such
state of residence could find success if the resident state's courts refuse on
public policy grounds to honor the choice of law provision. This issue,
then, will turn upon considerations such as the public policy of the state in
which the settlor resides-all of which would only be relevant should a

192. See id. at 166-67. For a discussion of the overlap between the gift and estate tax regimes,
see supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
193. See id. It should be noted that it was the settlor's spouse who possessed the veto power,

and there was a reciprocal trust situation likely to influence the spouse's willingness to exercise the
veto power. See id. This arrangement clearly influenced the court's opinion as to the significance
of the veto power.
194. The other reported decisions in this area seem to involve interpretations of state law, the
applicability of which did not appear to be in dispute and which left little doubt as to the rights of
creditors. See, e.g., Paolozzi v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 182,186-87 (1954) (finding giftincomplete
"[in view of the clear exposition of Massachusetts law" with respect to the right of creditors to
access the trust property); Vander Weele v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 340,344-45 (1956) (having a
similar result under Michigan law).
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court hearing a transfer tax case decide to delve into such issues. Such a
level of analysis would seem appropriate if raised by the IRS, since estate
inclusion under this theory turns on the state law rights of creditors-an
issue which cannot be resolved without first determining which state's law
applies. If the settlor resides in one of the minority of jurisdictions having
no stated public policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts, the transfer
tax planning result would in all likelihood be the exclusion of trust
property from the settlor's estate, since there would be little public policy
basis for ignoring the choice of law provision in the trust instrument.
Again, the fact that a transfer tax case would involve only a hypothetical
creditor strengthens the likelihood of this result.
However, for settlors residing in one of the majority of states having a
stated public policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts, it is entirely
unclear what the result of a transfer tax case would be were the IRS to
effectively call into question the issue of applicable state law. With other
federal court authority such as Portnoy and Brooks analyzing the policy
concerns which might overrule a settlor's choice of law with respect to an
OAPT, it is not at all certain that the tax court or any other federal court
confronted with an abusive transfer tax arrangement195 would not proceed
along similar lines to find on public policy grounds that, in the DAPT
context, the relevant state law is that of the settlor's domicile, and that
estate tax inclusion is therefore properly based upon that state's prohibition
of self-settled spendthrift trusts. While the interpretation set forth above of
the approach taken in cases such as Herzog, Outwin, and Estate of Uhl
mitigates against such court speculation as to the rights of a hypothetical
creditor, from a planning perspective there can be no certainty in this
regard.
For transfer tax planning purposes courts should respect the settlor's
choice of law as stated in the trust instrument, and courts should likewise
respect the relevant creditors' rights provisions of such law. This is
because for transfer tax planning purposes, a bright-line rule that can be
counted upon at the planning stage brings certainty to the transfer tax
planning process, and such certainty has its own public policy benefits
completely separate from any negative policy concerns posited in the
otherwise distinct creditors' rights context. 19 If the settlor of a DAPT
complies with the requirements for creating a valid DAPT under DAPT

195. For an abusive transfer tax situation as to which it is likely the court would go through
whatever level of analysis necessary to (rightfully) find against the taxpayer, see Estate of Paxton
v. Commissioner,86 T.C. 785 (1986), as to which the only true question seemed to be the rationale
upon which estate tax inclusion would be found appropriate.
196. See, e.g., VA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 96, § 597 ("It would be fatal for estate
planning if the validity of the trust or of a provision in the trust instrument should depend upon the

local law of the state in which a suit might subsequently be brought....").
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statutes which impose a trustee and asset management nexus between the
trust and the DAPT jurisdiction, it would not be unreasonable for courts in
transfer tax cases to respect the settlor's choice of governing DAPT
jurisdiction law and the creditors' rights provisions thereof. This is
particularly true if the settlor relied upon the same logic in reporting
transfers to the trust as completed gifts, based upon the DAPT
jurisdiction's denial of creditor access to the transferred property once
placed in the DAPT. The IRS would still be left with the implied
agreement prong of its retained interest argument to challenge perceived
abusive situations.
2. Implied Agreements
As noted above, the creditors' rights issue is not the only significant
avenue of attack by which the IRS might challenge the exclusion of trust
assets from the estate of a settlor-beneficiary. A second primary argument
likely to be asserted, if the facts so warrant, is that there was an implicit
arrangement between the settlor and the trustee (and perhaps the other trust
beneficiaries) that the settlor would continue to enjoy the trust property
notwithstanding the settlor's apparent right to such enjoyment only at the
trustee's discretion. From a planning perspective, there are guidelines
discernable from case law which can be followed to achieve some degree
of insulation from such a finding.
As an initial matter, inclusion under IRC section 2036(a)(1) may result
even though such an understanding is not expressly set forth in the trust
1
instrument, and even though the understanding is not legally enforceable. 97
"All that is necessary is that the surrounding circumstances, particularly the
manner in which the parties have dealt with the property, manifest the
existence of an implied agreement."' 98 Neither the reserved right to receive
distributions in the discretion of an independent trustee, nor the actual
receipt of trust distributions by the settlor-beneficiary, are alone sufficient
to result in inclusion-some prearrangement must exist for the required

197. See Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517, 519-20 (3rd Cir. 1963) (holding
estate inclusion proper by virtue of prearrangement as to settlor retained enjoyment of trust
property); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670-73 (3rd Cir. 1959) (holding
property includible by virtue of oral agreement that transferor would retain income therefrom,
regardless of whether such oral agreement was enforceable under state law); Estate of Paxton, 86
T.C. at 808 (agreement may be inferred); Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049, 1061
(1975) ("[I]t is not necessary that the reservation be expressed in the instrument of transfer or even
that it be legally enforceable. The statute also applies where the enjoyment has been retained
pursuant to a contemporaneous arrangement or understanding in connection with or incident to the

transfer.").
198. Estate of Whitt, 751 F.2d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985).
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retained interest to be found."' Whether or not such prearrangement or
understanding does exist is a question of fact,2'o and the burden is upon the
taxpayer to disprove such prearrangement where the IRS asserts a
deficiency on that basis."' 1
a. Pre-Transfer Discussions
To pass scrutiny under IRC section 2036(a)(1), the plan by which the
self-settled DAPT is created must be designed and implemented without
any oral or other understanding to the effect that the DAPT settlor will
receive distributions upon request or otherwise as desired. While this may
seem obvious, the planner must keep in mind that pre-transfer discussions
between the settlor and trustee, or perhaps between the trustee and some
other advisor or beneficiary having the ability to influence distributions to
the settlor, may be revealed and prove detrimental to the settlor's estate
should transfer tax litigation arise.2'
b. Pre-Transfer Financial Analysis
Also in the realm of pre-transfer activities, perhaps the most important
undertaking the planner should require is the preparation of a financial
analysis designed to inform the settlor of the precise impact of the gift
upon the settlor's personal cash flow. Even though one of the primary
transfer tax planning benefits of the self-settled DAPT is the settlor's
ability to remain a discretionary beneficiary of the DAPT while avoiding
estate inclusion of the trust property, the financial analysis should be
prepared as if the property were being given away without any retained
interest whatsoever. This documented analysis is beneficial for several
199. See Estate of Sldnner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d
517 (3rd Cir. 1963); Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305 (1981) ("[Ihe
triggering event of section 2036(a)(1) is not the mere receipt of income... ; some arrangement or
understanding, and certainly not the mere inclusion of a provision allowing the trustee to distribute
and the decedent to receive such income or corpus, is necessary for section 2036(a)(1) to apply.")

(citations omitted); Estate of Green, 64 T.C. at 1061 ('The mere fact of receiving all the income
from property previously transferred..

.

does not of itself trigger the operation of section

2036(a)(1); there must have been a reservation of such enjoyment.").
200. See Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997).
201. See Estateof Whitt, 751 F.2d at 1560; Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C. at 808; Estate of Wells,
42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1305 (noting that the burden is a heavy one).
202. For example, in Estate of Green, the court found it irrelevant that the settlor-beneficiary

herself never met personally with the corporate trustee, in light of discussions between the settlorbeneficiary's son/attorney and the corporate trustee at the time the corporate trustee agreed to serve.
64 T.C. at 1052. The court did find relevant the fact that distributions under the trust agreement,
which were directed under the trust agreement to be made quarterly in the trustee's discretion, were
changed from quarterly to monthly upon the settlor-beneficiary's subsequent inquiry as to why she

was not getting her money. See id.
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reasons. First, the settlor should have some minimum level of comfort that
the transferred property is not essential to the continued maintenance of the
settlor' s standard of living.0 3 In fact, several commentators have noted that
from a strict asset protection standpoint, it is only a "nest egg" that should
be transferred to the DAPT.0 4 Second, such analysis will provide strong
evidence that the settlor clearly understood and approached the transfer as
one without any retained interest other than a mere expectancy, and that the
distribution of property from the trust to the settlor-beneficiary was beyond
any control or influence of the settlor. From a transfer tax perspective, this
can be significant.
Demonstrative of these two reasons for conducting such a financial
analysis is the court's decision in Estate of Wells v. Commissioner.205 In
that case, the IRS asserted that a proscribed prearrangement was evidenced
by the settlor's receipt until her death of all of the income from a selfsettled trust.' In rejecting this argument and finding in favor of the
settlor's estate, the court emphasized that prior to making the transfer in
trust, the settlor-beneficiary had specifically requested (and received) a
financial projection showing how the absence of the property transferred
to the trust would affect her remaining cash flow. 2 7 The financial analysis
demonstrated to the court that the settlor clearly approached the transfer as
a completed gift, and not as a retained interest transfer.0"
In contrast, several courts have, on other facts, found an implied
understanding that the settlor would continue to enjoy the trust property,
where the reality of the settlor's post-transfer financial situation clearly
revealed that the settlor could not reasonably have transferred the property
without some clear understanding as to how the property would continue
to benefit the settlor. Estate of Paxton2" is one such tax court case in
which the settlor-"a wealthy man accustomed to living
well"-transferred most of his assets to self-settled spendthrift trusts,
except for certain patent royalty rights which were set to expire by the time

203. This comment should not be taken as contradictory to the discussion above concerning
the DAPT as a vehicle which might help certain clients overcome a reluctance to part with property
otherwise implicated as ideal for a gift and estate tax planning transfer. Rather, the above
discussion posits that it is the possibility that property transferred to a DAPT could be utilized on
behalf of the settlor which will often assist the client in resolving conflicting emotions about giving
property away absolutely, without the possibility ofreceiving any future benefit from such property
even in the most dire of circumstances.
204. CASNER & PENNEUL, supranote 12, § 4.1.4; Engel, in DIAMoND, supra note 23, [ 1000.
205. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1305.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. 86 T.C. at 785.
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the settlor reached age sixty-four. 210 The court supported its finding of an
impermissible prearrangement by noting that:
[w]e do not think he [the settlor] would have left himself
virtually destitute at that age [of 64] without an understanding
that he would receive the income or corpus or both from the
trusts when and as needed .... [The settlor], in creating the
trusts, was parting with virtually all he owned when his patent
licensing agreements expired; he would hardly have risked
giving up all his assets without making some arrangement 211
to
get some income or property back if and when he needed it.
A third and perhaps equally important benefit to having a pre-transfer
financial analysis which shows no significant detriment to the settlor's
overall financial well-being is the potential that such fact will support the
settlor's position should the trust's asset protection features be called into
question. The financial analysis could be cited as evidence that the transfer
was not fraudulent in that at the time of the transfer, the settlor retained
ample assets to meet all but the most unexpected of contingencies. This
could also be relevant to the planner assisting in the asset transfers should
that planner's conduct be challenged as aiding the alleged fraud.212 In
addition, where the settlor resides in a state having an express public policy
against self-settled spendthrift trusts, the financial analysis could be cited
as evidence that the transfer at issue does not thwart the state's public
policy because the settlor was not merely trying to remove assets from the
reach of creditors while continuing to enjoy the benefits of the property.
Since estate inclusion may follow creditors' rights in trust property, which
in turn may depend upon the law deemed to govern the validity of the
trust, 213 such arguments could prove particularly persuasive in the context
of a transfer tax case where the IRS must argue on behalf of only a

210. Id. at 810.
211. Id. at 810, 813 (citations and footnotes omitted). Other decisions demonstrate similar
logic in reaching similar conclusions. See, e.g., Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049,
1062 (1975) (noting that settlor transferred approximately 85% of her assets to the trust and
concluding "it seems highly unlikely she would have done so without some understanding that she
would receive at least the comparatively modest amount of income generated by the transferred
[assets] plus a portion of the corpus as well."). Cf., e.g., Vander Weele v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.
340, 341 (1956) ("[The Settlor] expressed no desire to provide benefits for [the other trust
beneficiaries] except in the event that a portion of the trust fund remained at her death, but spoke
only of her purpose to ensure that she would have sufficient income to take care of her own needs
for the remainder of her life.").
212. See CASNER&PENNELL, supra note 12, 1 4.1.4 n.42 (suggesting a series of disclosures
and representations which an attorney should insist upon prior to undertaking any asset protection
planning on behalf of that client).
213. See supra Part V.B.3. (discussing the choice of laws issues affecting DAPTs).
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hypothetical creditor who has suffered no real injury as a result of the
transfer.

c. Additional Trust Beneficiaries
The settlor's case against estate inclusion may also be strengthened by
the presence of other trust beneficiaries. If those beneficiaries may also
receive distributions during the settlor's lifetime, the settlor's arguments
should be strengthened for many of the same reasons that a financial
analysis indicative of a true gift might prove persuasive.21 4

d. Trustees
Selection of trustees and other "advisors" or persons having influence
over whether the settlor-beneficiary receives distributions from the trust is
another important planning factor. As to veto powers over distributions to
the settlor or similar prerequisites to the settlor's receipt of trust
distributions, that barrier alone will not prevent estate inclusion if the
power-holder is subservient to the settlor's wishes. 2 5 As to trustees, the
settlor's case should be bolstered if a clearly independent corporate
fiduciary resident in the DAPT jurisdiction is selected. However, this fact
alone will not preclude the finding of an implicit understanding as to the
settlor's retained enjoyment of the trust property, as the courts have
recognized that "[m]ost settlors would have no trouble finding a trustee
friendly to his interests who could be counted on to honor [an] informal
prearrangement to exercise 'absolute discretion' over income payments in
favor of the settlor during his life. '216 Notwithstanding the apparent

214. This argument is, to some extent, deduced from situations where the court found that the
property was properly includible in the transferor's estate due to the absence of other beneficiaries.
See, e.g., Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding transferred real
estate includible in decedent-transferor's gross estate under IRC section 2036(a)(1), and noting as
"highly significant" the fact that donee's enjoyment of the transferred property was delayed until
the transferor's death, which implicated the testamentary-like transfer policy underlying inclusion
under IRC section 2036(a)(1)); see also Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941)
(presence of other beneficiaries deemed significant in context of creditors' rights under unsettled
state law); Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 22, 25 (1955) (distinguishing Herzog based
upon the lack of other trust beneficiaries in the case at hand), rev'd, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
215. See, e.g, Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C. at 813 & n.24 (noting subservient family member
trustee as fact weighing in favor of finding implied agreement); Estate of McCabe v. United States,
475 F.2d 1142, 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("it appears that the three parties [wife, settlor and individual
trustee] at all times treated the decedent as having the right to receive the trust corpus, exercisable
on the mere formality of his wife's demand.").
216. Estate of Skinner v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 726,730 (E.D. Pa. 1961). The district
court decision in Skinnerwas affirmed by the Third Circuit, which similarly noted that "every case
of this sort must stand on its own facts and.., the practice of assuming that a trustee, corporate or
otherwise, is necessarily independent of the [settlor-beneficiary] whom he represents, need not be
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independence of a trustee, therefore, the actual administration of the trust
will be an important factor in finding for or against the existence of an
implied agreement.217
e. Trust Distributions
As noted above, mere receipt of distributions from the trust will not
alone result in a finding of an implied agreement.2 18 However, the case law
is somewhat mixed as to the significance of the settlor's receipt of
distributions, and the most reasonable conclusion would seem to be that
receipt by the settlor of all trust income or of income at regular intervals or
in regular amounts, would weaken the settlor' s argument that there was no
implied understanding as to the settlor's retained enjoyment. 2 9 Indeed,
absent a drastic change in the settlor's financial situation-the fear of
which may have motivated the use of a DAPT instead of a non-DAPT
irrevocable trust to begin with-distributions to the settlor from the trust
run counter to a true gift tax planning strategy by denying such distributed
amounts (and appreciation thereon) to the non-settlor beneficiaries, and
because the distributed amounts may ultimatelybe included in the settlor's
gross estate by virtue of the settlor's unfettered possession of such amounts
at death.
On the other hand, it should be permissible to include a standard
guiding the trustee's discretion as to distributions to the settlor, so long as
that standard may not be enforced by the settlor so as to require that a
distribution be made to the settlor.22 An "absolute discretion" standard is
followed invariably, but may be rebutted by circumstances." 316 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1963).
217. See Estate of Skinner, 197 F. Supp. at 730.

218. See, e.g., EstateofWells v. Commissioner, 42T.C.M. (CCH) 1305(1981) (holdingestate
inclusion was not proper despite settlor's receipt of all trust income during her lifetime).
219. Compare id. (holding trust property not includible under IRC section 2036(a)(1) despite
receipt by settlor of all trust income in discretion of her trustee-son), with Estate of Paxton, 86 T.C.
at 811-12 ("However, continuous receipt of substantial amounts of trust income is not necessary
to support the finding of a prearrangement under section 2036(a)(1)."). In this regard, see also
Estate of Skinner, where the court stated in connection with its holding that a prearrangement
existed and thus property was includible under IRC section 2036(a)(1):
The holding here does not necessarily cover facts where, in the exercise of the
trustee's "discretion," the settlor has received the entire income for life but there
is no evidence from which any prearrangement can be inferred; or where the
settlor has received only part of the income from the trust property, and at
irregular intervals and in irregular amounts, or under any other circumstances in
which the election of the trustee to pay income regularly to the settlor apparently
was not foreordained at the time of the execution of the trust.
197 F. Supp. at 730.
220. See BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 123,

126.6.4 (discussing in the context of IRC
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therefore the recommended approach, although the settlor might feel more
secure by including in the trust instrument a non-ascertainable standard to
which reference could nevertheless be made in the event the settlor were
later to become destitute.
f. Trust Administration
Finally, the formal arrangement, which should be designed to avoid
estate inclusion, must itself be honored in the actual administration of the
trust. The trustee should make adequate investigation of beneficiary
circumstances prior to making distributions, or at least have some
discernable criteria for making distributions in order to avoid the
implication that distributions were made simply at the settlor's
command.221 Similarly, and of particular relevance where family members
or other subservient trustees are utilized, the formalities of the trust
arrangement should be meticulously respected.22
g. The Bottom Line
The foregoing considerations indicate that the likelihood of estate
inclusion under IRC section 2036(a)(1) by virtue of an implied agreement
can be adequately addressed through careful pre-transfer planning and
independent post-transfer administration. Some of the planning implicated
in this regard-such as a pre-transfer financial plan-may also enhance the
settlor's argument that the governing law stated in the instrument should
control, and, therefore, that inclusion under the creditors' rights theory of
IRC section 2036 or section 2038 would be improper. However, while the
implied agreement concept can be fairly effectively dealt with from the
outset-and thus some degree of certainty assured 3-the use of a DAPT
for transfer tax planning by a nonresident of the DAPT jurisdiction is
currently uncertain given the concerns about the level of creditor protection
actually afforded by a DAPT and uncertainty as to the depth of the
creditors' rights analysis likely to be applied by a court considering a
transfer tax dispute but having before it only a hypothetical creditor.

section 2036(a)(1) the transferor's right to income under a standard which may be asserted to
compel a distribution to the transferor, and those which might not be so enforced).
221. See, e.g., Estate of McCabe v. United States, 475 F.2d 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (clear that
distributions were made to settlor's wife/trust beneficiary and deposited in settlor's account, all at
settlor's command and without regard to distribution standard stated in instrument).
222. See, e.g., Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997) (with
the knowledge of and without objection by other partners, decedent commingled partnership funds
with her own for her personal use).
223. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (regarding the factual nature of this

inquiry).
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VIII. CONCLUSION: PoLIcY QUESTIONS ABOUND
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to address the extent to

which the recent advent of domestic asset protection trust legislation
impacts transfer tax planning. Although questions abound concerning the
effectiveness of such domestic legislation in shielding assets from the
claims of the settlor's creditors, no less significant are the transfer tax
planning ramifications of the potential for a completed gift of property with
retained lifetime discretionary enjoyment of the gifted property, without
inclusion of such property in the transferor's gross estate at death. The true
extent to which the transfer tax planning dynamic has or will be affected
is likely to be further influenced by policy issues that necessarily permeate
any consideration as to what the new domestic statutes mean (or should
mean) to wealthy individuals and the financial and legal communities.
Putting aside for the moment the obvious policy questions of whether such
asset protection is desirable or should be permitted at all-since such
protection will continue to be available offshore notwithstanding domestic
policy concerns-the now available domestic APT raises additional
significant policy issues at both the state and federal level.
A. Transfer Tax Policy Issues
The merits of considering the use of a DAPT in connection with a
wealth transfer plan is to some extent enhanced by a simple policy
argument. Specifically, with respect to the likely depth of court analysis of
the creditors' rights issue in a transfer tax dispute, Treasury concerns over
the growth of offshore trust arrangements should compel the IRS to avoid
any arguments that favor OAPTs relative to DAPTs. 24 For example, if the
IRS is confronted with a settlor who previously paid gift taxes upon
funding a DAPT, and if there is no evidence of an implied understanding
that the settlor would continue to enjoy trust property during the settlor's
lifetime, the IRS would be ill-advised to pursue estate inclusion of DAPT
assets based upon the conceivable range of potential creditor challenges to
the effectiveness of the domestic legislation in actually shielding trust
assets from creditor claims. This is because in the hypothetical creditor
context, there are simply more bases upon which the creditor protection
offered by a DAPT might fail relative to those upon which an OAPT might
fail. For example, the full faith and credit and other potential U.S.
Constitutional challenges to DAPTs cannot be raised by the IRS in a case
involving an OAPT. Exploitation of such additional DAPT weaknesses by
the IRS would thus facilitate a DAPT-OAPT disparity in a manner that is
inconsistent with Treasury concerns about the offshore trust industry.

224. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the IRS always has the option of pursuing estate inclusion based
on the implied agreement analysis discussed above, should the IRS view
a situation as abusive. 2"
On the other hand, should the IRS choose to argue for estate inclusion
with respect to assets held in either a DAPT or OAPT based on the creditor
protection issue, it would not be unreasonable for a court to find estate
inclusion proper where a deceased settlor-beneficiary resided in and
maintained significant contacts with ajurisdiction having an express public
policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts. The court might simply note
authority establishing the resident state's public policy, cite (for example)
In re Portnoy 26 and the Restatement rule to find that the trust would not
be recognized as valid by the state of the settlor's domicile at death,227 and
therefore hold that for transfer tax purposes creditors will be deemed able
to reach the trust property such that estate inclusion is proper. An IRS
argument to this effect could be pursued with equal aggressiveness against
both DAPTs and OAPTs, since the same rationale could invalidate either
type of trust on the basis of the public policy of the state in which the
settlor resided at death. Moreover, this line of analysis arguably recasts the
OAPT-DAPT disparity into a disparity between trusts in which the settlor
remains a beneficiary versus the more traditional irrevocable trust under
the terms of which the settlor is completely excluded as a beneficiary.
Nevertheless, pursuing such an argument might be risky for the IRS.
Specifically, the higher likelihood of a non-APT forum state's courts
having jurisdiction over a DAPT trustee and trust property relative to an
OAPT trustee and trust property, may once again put the IRS at a
disadvantage from the policy standpoint of seeking estate inclusion of
DAPT assets such that a disparity between OAPTs and DAPTs is
created.228 This is because at some point a court may acknowledge that the
creditors' rights rationale for estate inclusion of trust property should entail
practical availability of such assets to satisfy creditor claims, and

225. See Part VII.E.2., supra (discussing the implied agreement analysis); see also MartyNelson, supra note 5, at 443 (suggesting implied agreement analysis as possible view of OAPT

estate tax inclusion issue).
226. 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
227. See supra Part VI.B.3, note 6 and accompanying text. At least one other commentator has
suggested that other states should recognize the Alaska and Delaware statutes as valid, since such
recognition would likely keep more assets onshore, rather than offshore in potential tax haven
jurisdictions. See RoundtableDiscussion,supranote 33, at 796 (comments of Gideon Rothschild).
In addition, Marty-Nelson, supranote 5, at 442-45, should be consulted with respect to options for
"equalizing domestic and foreign trusts," although that commentary was proffered prior to the new
domestic legislation and at a time when only offshore trusts were believed to offer self-settled asset
protection.
228. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of personal and in
rem jurisdiction).
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jurisdictional concerns alone favor the practical availability of DAPT
assets over those held in an OAPT. For example, where creditor recovery
is expressly precluded under the APT jurisdiction's laws, a non-APT
forum court'sjurisdiction over the trustee and/or trust property would seem
to be a prerequisite to creditor recovery (and therefore estate inclusion),
and such jurisdiction is more likely to be established in the case of a DAPT
having a domestic trustee. Consider in this regard an estate tax dispute
arising under the facts of the Portnoycase 2 9 subsequent to the Bankruptcy
Court's holding that trust assets were not immune to creditor claims under
what the court found to be the non-APT jurisdiction's governing law
(which differed from the governing law stated in the trust instrument). If
the trust at issue were an OAPT and the OAPT assets were of unknown
character due to the court's inability to compel disclosure by the offshore
trustee over which the court lacked jurisdiction, the settlor's estate could
argue in the transfer tax dispute that estate inclusion is improper because
(i) the settlor's creditors cannot actually reach the OAPT property due to
the bankruptcy (or other forum) court's complete lack of jurisdiction over
the OAPT trustee or its assets-i.e., the touted creditor protection is real;
and therefore (ii) the court should base its transfer tax decision on actual
creditor's rights as demonstrated by practical considerations inherent in the
governing law under which the trust was administered throughout the
settlor's lifetime. Such practical considerations would likely be lacking in
the case of a DAPT, since the bankruptcy court would clearly have
jurisdiction to enforce its judgment against any domestic trustee upon
finding on conflicts of law and public policy grounds that the trust did not
preclude creditor recovery against trust assets. Should the IRS succeed in
a transfer tax challenge involving a DAPT, and should the court mention
either the non-APT state's or the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over trust
assets and trustees as relevant in the estate inclusion determination, the IRS
will have essentially demonstrated another potential advantage of going
offshore. If such jurisdiction is deemed relevant in a reported decision, and
if such jurisdiction can clearly be thwarted in the case of an OAPT more
easily than in the case of a DAPT, the transfer tax disparity may again be
recast as one of OAPT/traditional irrevocable trust versus the DAPT. Still,
the foregoing lines of reasoning to some extent seem to depart from the
level of scrutiny employed by the courts on behalf of a hypothetical
creditor in transfer tax cases.
However, none of those transfer tax cases address a bona fide choice of
law dispute such as that raised in In re Portnoy. The point is, there is an
uncertain degree of security in planning for transfer tax advantages

229. 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), discussed at supra notes 102-21 and
accompanying text.
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potentially available to a DAPT settlor residing in ajurisdiction which has
not disavowed the generally accepted public policy invalidating self-settled
spendthrift trusts, and this uncertainty limits-but does not defeat at the
client's option after careful disclosure-the potential utilization of a DAPT
in connection with a wealth transfer plan. Any IRS approach to an estate
tax situation involving a DAPT, other than complete acquiescence on the
creditors' rights issue, raises multiple policy questions which may
ultimately shape the transfer tax parameters of planning with a DAPT.
B. State Policy Dilemma
That Alaska and Nevada have provided more narrow protection for
spouses and dependent children than has Delaware raises an interesting
public policy dilemma for current non-DAPT states, and particularly those
states which desire to compete in the APT market but not at the cost of all
public policy concerns thereby raised. Specifically, it would seem that
states reevaluating the policies underlying the self-settled spendthrift trust
prohibition must choose between: (1) strengthening laws which favor
creditorspursuing claims against resident settlor-beneficiaries of a DAPT
formed under the laws of and located in a different jurisdiction; or (2)
wholly abandoning the prohibition against self-settled spendthrift trusts,
with little or no public policy exceptions for particular classes of creditors.
Strengthening the self-settled spendthrift trust prohibition, and the
policy expressions and creditors' rights relating to such trusts, would be a
prudent course of action for any state not wishing to compete in the APT
market, because both DAPT and OAPT challenges will inevitably arise in
such states as the prevalence of such trusts grows.
In contrast, a partial effort to compete-by, for example, enacting
DAPT legislation which includes more public policy-based creditor
exceptions than provided for under Alaska's statute-could prove very
counter-productive. This is because residents of any state permitting
DAPTs but falling short of the Alaska debtor-friendly standard might take
their trust business out-of-state to Alaska. In such circumstance, the
settlor's domiciliary state will have provided an added benefit to its
resident-settlor by eviscerating the general public policy arguments for
invalidating the Alaska spendthrift protection, in light of the settlor's
domiciliary state having rejected generally the public policy against selfsettled spendthrift trusts.230

230. It seems this dilemma may have to some extent played itself out in the context of the
Alaska-Delaware duel to become the leading trust jurisdiction. Specifically, Delaware has already
amended its trust act to delete one stated exception which would have permitted creditors to
invalidate the trust to the extent the extension of credit was made in reliance on representations by
the settlor as to the availability of trust assets. See Nenno, supra note 40, at 3 (noting this
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As an example of the foregoing dilemma, consider a Delaware resident
who establishes a DAPT utilizing the potentially more protective Alaska
legislation to provide for Alaska trustees, administration, and situs.
General third-party creditors (i.e., not a dependent child or spouse) seeking
to invalidate the settlor's Alaska DAPT would likely pursue their claims
initially in the Delaware courts, since that is where the settlor remains
domiciled and where significant contacts with the creditor relationship are
likely to be the strongest. Public policy arguments proffered to the
Delaware courts by the creditor as grounds for invalidating the Alaska
DAPT should fail. This is because the basic public policy of the Delaware
(that is, the forum state) would, for purposes relevant to the general
creditor, seem to be in accord with the public policy of Alaska (i.e., the
state the laws of which were chosen by the debtor-settlor to govern the
validity and operation of the DAPT), since the Delaware and Alaska trust
legislation are very similar in the protection afforded settlor-beneficiaries
against the claims of general third-party creditors. Thus, by attempting to
compete but at a level less debtor-friendly than Alaska, Delaware has
potentially abandoned its former public policy against self-settled
spendthrift trusts, but to little competitive avail given the other APT
options available to the settlor seeking the highest level of domestic asset
protection. Moreover, it seems that Alaska's more limited enunciated
exceptions to its DAPT legislation should translate into a more favorable
resolution of any transfer tax dispute relating to a settlor' s retained interest
in an Alaska DAPT, since a court's analysis in a transfer tax dispute might
very well end after a cursory analysis of the Alaska statute posited under
the trust instrument as governing creditors' rights.23'
The possible consequence of this dilemma could be either (1) states
following Alaska's lead wholeheartedly so as not to be perceived as
weaker in the competitive environment for asset protection; or (2) states
acting against a loss of resident business by more pointedly enunciating
public policy mandates against self-settled spendthrift trusts, perhaps even
going so far as to amend conflicts of law rules which might otherwise
result in the law of Alaska (or a similar APT jurisdiction) being held to
govern a creditors' right to DAPT trust property in an action brought in
that amending state's courts.

amendment but without analysis-but also opining that the Delaware "exception for alimony, child
support, and property division is an exception that would almost certainly exist even if it were not
in the statute because it is highly unlikely that any court in the U.S. would permit a child to go
without support while the settlor/parent was living-perhaps very well-on funds received from

a retained interest in trust.").
231. The thought being that such a dispute most likely would turn upon the IRS arguing on
behalf of the rights of a hypothetical creditor, and in that regard focusing upon the hypothetical
dependent spouse or child as creditor, the rights of which could result in estate inclusion.
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Just as Alaska, Delaware, and Nevada noticed and reacted to the
burgeoning offshore trust industry, more U.S. states are likely to take note
of the domestic opportunities now available to settlors. How such states
respond will have a significant bearing upon transfer tax planning
dynamics. For example, consider the likely topics of discussion at
upcoming estate and gift tax planning seminars if DAPTs were to go the
route of LLCs-receiving a clear IRS blessing of general applicability and
suddenly becoming the norm in all U.S. jurisdictions.

